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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

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International Affairs

Editorial Expects U.S. Dialogue Under Clinton

93AE0142D Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic
9 Nov 92 pp 1, 11

[Editorial: "The American-Palestinian Dialogue"]

[Text] Will the administration of American President-elect Bill Clinton resume its dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization when it officially takes power this 20 January?

President Yasir 'Arafat indicated, in an interview with the London paper AL-HAYAH yesterday, that American promises in this regard have postponed the resumption of the dialogue until after the presidential elections. Now that these elections are over, what are the chances that the "verbal promises" will be fulfilled and turned into actual fact, in the context of the ongoing political negotiations on the road to achieving and helping the success of the peace process in the region?

The dialogue between Palestinian Ambassador Hakam al-Bal'awi and his American counterpart in Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, was halted, in any case, in June 1990, after having gone on for 18 months. It was noted at the time that the pretext for Washington's decision to stop or suspend the talks was illogical, not only in its political interpretation, but also because it was a surrender to Israel's Likud Party. Perhaps it was also preparatory to the blockading and pressuring of the PLO only a few months before the second destructive Gulf war.

Even so, and without going into the old excuses and causes, we are now in a new phase with possibilities for change and development. Likud is out in Israel, and the Republicans are out in the United States. Before that, there had been a peace process growing on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, just as there had been a wide international means for achieving political settlements throughout the whole world on the basis UN authorities.

Thus the Clinton administration is actually prepared to conform with these possibilities for change and development, both inside and outside the United States. To the extent that Clinton himself is concerned with basic issues—his country's domestic problems—he understands the link between the domestic scene in the United States and the outside world, through America's responsibility as the only superpower in the world and its responsibility toward the necessity of overseeing the peace process.

Despite that, we see the way prepared for the resumption of the American-Palestinian dialogue, serving the interests of all sides, and through it, and most importantly, the interests of peace, democracy, justice, and the human and political rights of the peoples of the region.

Commentary Questions U.S. Silence Over Deportations

JN1812212692 Sanaa Voice of Palestine in Arabic
1844 GMT 18 Dec 92

[Commentary by political editor of the PALESTINIAN NEWS AGENCY, WAFA: "Terrorism Awaiting a Court Ruling Along the Border"]

[Text] The collective deportation of 418 Palestinians from their homeland is dirty, rancorous, and terrorist. It is aimed at terrorizing and taming all the Palestinian people. The basic objective of the deportations is to evict Palestinians from the occupied territories. We are fed up with the game of sham democracy, which is applauded by the West, and the United States in particular. Does not the scene of Israelis waiting for a Supreme Court ruling paint an extremely ugly picture in the contemporary age; the picture of hundreds of Palestinian youths, handcuffed in trucks in the open, awaiting a ruling from the occupiers' court to avenge the killing of a Jewish officer, who himself may have killed one or more Palestinians? After all, Palestinians are being killed each and every day.

Rabin's anger has proven to be greater than the international uproar. He did not deem sufficient the killing of three Palestinians in retaliation for the killing of a single Jew—three Palestinians killed since the killing of officer Toledano. His anger assumed horrific proportions, reaching the extent of deporting 418 Palestinians, not to mention three martyrs. Expulsions are tantamount to criminal murder and execution. Indeed, expulsion is harsher than shooting.

We do not see the wisdom of placing Palestinians along the border with Lebanon, in the open and handcuffed, pending a ruling by the Supreme Court, in the extremely chilly weather in the occupied southern Lebanese heights. Indeed, it is a form of inhuman torture, not authored by Hitler or Goebbels this time, but by Rabin himself. It is a crude and innovative method of torture practiced in front of the entire world. What does the U.S. Administration in particular, both the outgoing and incoming teams, have to say about this? Why do Jews have the right to kill us on a daily basis, to imprison our children, and to torture our women? Why do we not have the right to resist such acts? Why do we not have the right to be accorded decent treatment, even less than equal treatment? We are not deemed qualified to receive equal treatment.

A few weeks ago, television cameras filmed the unmistakably premeditated murder of a Palestinian apprehended by an intelligence officer so he could be killed by a soldier, who was guarded by another soldier. When two women attempted to treat the wounds of the Palestinian, the soldiers pushed her away savagely, causing her to fall to the ground. What did the U.S. Administration have to say about that scene? What does it have to say now about 418 Palestinians, who are being held in the border area, handcuffed, blindfolded, and about to be expelled from their homeland?

The Washington negotiations were halted yesterday to protest this Israeli decision. Will the protest be of any use to those 418 Palestinians who will be expelled from their homeland? What will their fate be in the negotiating process? Will they be deemed refugees? If so, will the refugee committee, which is part of the multilateral talks, address their fate? Or will their plight be listed on the agendas of other committees at a time when settlements continue to be built and multiply?

These questions are posed to all without exception, including the Arabs, who have thus far failed to realize that their fate will be abysmal if they fail to repulse this Jewish

terrorism, and also if they fail to make the United States employ uniform standards and criteria, which must remain unchanged regardless of color, religion, or language. The issue meant to be underscored by these questions is that protecting the Palestinian people has become a pressing necessity dictated by the need to uphold human rights in our age.

'Official Circles' Criticize U.S. Training Plan

93AE0149B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 21 Nov 92 p 6

[Report from Amman by Ruba al-Husari: "Dissension Within the Occupied Territories and Motives Are Questioned"]

[Text] There is strong competition between the United States and Europe, and also among Western European countries, to train senior Palestinian officials who would administer the affairs of the occupied territories during the transition period. That training is giving rise to arguments, even among the Palestinians.

The European Common Market has, since the peace process began more than a year ago, proposed to create and fund programs to train Palestinians in the areas of planning and administration in preparation for the transition period.

They proposed that such training take place at European universities and institutions in order to meet needs defined by the Palestinians themselves.

International agencies also have begun to operate in the occupied territories by funding areas of interest and priority ranging from vocational training and economic projects to service training, especially as it relates to top [government] administration.

An American plan to train Palestinians to administer self-government during the period of transition was presented at the meetings of the economic development committee of the multilateral talks held in Paris at the end of last month. The plan, however, incensed participating European countries, who saw in it "an attempt at imposing American control over European plans." The Palestinians, on the other hand, made acceptance of the U.S. offer conditional on a European-American accord, which was indeed signed at the conclusion of the recent Paris talks.

Palestinian sources that took part in the Paris talks said that the American offer was accepted by the Palestinians after it was agreed that European projects are to be directly carried out within the framework of the European Market or through bilateral channels between the various countries and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The American plan, on the other hand, is to be implemented within the framework of multilateral talks by governmental and nongovernmental international agencies. The sources added that a Palestinian agency or institution to adopt the American project has yet to be named. The Palestinians are to prepare a detailed list of their training requirements, and the U.S. State Department will choose the [implementation] mechanism and the American agency that will sponsor the plan.

Already under implementation are a French project to acquaint the Palestinians with French municipal procedures and two German project to identify ways of planning

general elections during the period of transition and of conducting a population census and verifying registrations.

Holland and Sweden are among the countries working on projects of bi-lateral cooperation. When the fields in which Palestinians need trained personnel are identified, the project will be jointly financed by [countries of] the European Market, and suitable training sites will be chosen.

European sources indicated that international agencies operating in the occupied territories, such as UNDP [UN Development Program], Amideast [America-Mideast Educational and Training Services], and ANERA [American Near East Refugee Aid], have enlarged their future budgets "because of growing and varied Palestinian requirements."

The plans evoke reservations in Palestinian circles and criticism by some. There are two points of contention—the training of personnel in the United States and Europe and the Palestinian employment procedures. [?]

Some have criticized official Palestinian circles for accepting the American offer to train administrators and personnel on the grounds that "it would bring in a Palestinian administration with Western and American mentalities that would not heed the Palestinian people's experience, advantages, heritage, and mentality." Other criticize entering into such arrangements "before Palestinian-Israeli talks reach agreement on the period of transition or on the competence of the Council that is to administer it."

Still other Palestinians are worried over the "rush" by Europeans and Americans to get a foothold in the occupied territories in order to serve narrow interests that do not necessarily target what is best for the Palestinians." Those fears are manifested in warnings heard in the past few years that the investment of funds in the occupied territories is merely a "technique for the political, economic, and cultural infiltration of Palestinian society."

Other criticisms are directed at the Palestinian internal methodology of picking the right individuals for the proposed training programs. The individuals chosen will fill senior administration positions during the transition period, and those who receive training will be imposed as administrators of that [interim government] regime by virtue of the experience and training they receive.

Regional Affairs

Al-Hasan Rejects Federation With Israel

93AE0144A London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18 Nov 92 p 4

[Report of Hani al-Hasan Speech in Amman: "Rabin Wants Separate Peace With Jordan and Syria To Annex West Bank; Peace Talks Stuck"]

[Excerpts] Fatah Central Committee member Hani al-Hasan said yesterday that Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations have reached a true deadlock and that the enactment of unified Arab policies must put an end to the crisis, prevent the outbreak of explosions in the region, and enable the Palestinian delegation to reject the idea of separate solutions. Al-Hasan, who was speaking at a symposium organized by the Shuman Establishment, criticized Palestinian parties that accept the principle of negotiating over

land as the basis for Palestinian principles. "Our problem in the negotiations is that we have no fixed principle other than not withdrawing from the negotiations." He confirmed that "the fixed principle is the return of the land, Israeli withdrawal, not letting go of Jerusalem, and not negotiating over land."

Al-Hasan criticized Palestinian and Jordanian regionalism, which has begun to mount in Jordan. After affirming his Palestinian identity, he called for the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederal union to break the deadlock the Palestinians, as well as all the Arabs, have reached.

He said, "We must seek how, through popular action, we can break out of the dilemma, and I, as a Palestinian, believe that a confederation with Jordan is in the regional and local interest of the Palestinians."

Criticizing the Palestinian regionalist view, he said that "it is a strategic deviation of thinking, that some Palestinians say that they may study confederation with Israel but not confederation with Jordan." Directing his remarks to East Bank Jordanians who reject dealing with the Palestinian question and who think it does not affect them, he said: "It is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater for the East Bank Jordanians to say 'We have nothing to do with the Palestinian situation.'"

Al-Hasan acknowledged that there were differences within Fatah over a political settlement, but confirmed that all Palestinian factions were of divided and differing opinions from the inside as regarded the political settlement. "In the beginning," he said, "I had an opinion, but it was not the majority opinion. What makes the situation different now is that the logic that dominated in the beginning is at an end. Now we want to have an opinion on things; there is no fear of a multiplicity of views, and this is good and healthy."

He said: "Progress on a Palestinian solution is now at zero, as a result of the assessment made recently in Tunis after studying the minutes of the negotiation minutes. Another reason for the crisis is the acceptance of [multiple] tracks. We must review this question, and reach a Syrian-Palestinian-Jordanian and of course Lebanese understanding with the aim of resisting any isolationist view, by looking at shared interests." [Passage on world economy omitted]

"Today we have examined the negotiating logic we have been using. There is no longer any room for independent reasoning or for conflict. What is happening today in the recent Washington negotiations? There is still no progress made, and I say this after reading the minutes of the meetings. In the last round, the Israelis proposed, 'We want to give you a phase of transitional autonomy, but on what territories?' The Israelis proposed that the land be divided into three zones: municipalities and villages, which would be the autonomous zone—a third of the area of the West Bank and Gaza. As for Allon's security plan, the army, and the areas where there are settlements (28 percent of the land)—'You have nothing to do with it.' As for the state-owned land, they invited us to negotiate over it—so: a third for them, a third for us, and a third that we negotiate over. Is it permissible for anyone to agree to negotiate over whose this land is? The negotiation should be over the withdrawal and the security measures. Their staying and taking 1 percent of the land is something that is nonnegotiable."

10 Factions

"I say to the 10 factions that signed the memorandum: The topic of land is not open to consultation. The people will be consulted about an accord, not the land. Secondly, the Israelis talk to us and say there will be no legislative elections. Rabin offered two options: 'If you want a parliament, I agree to 54 members. They will elect an executive committee, not an autonomous Palestinian government.' Rabin wants us to falsify it for the people and cancel the form of government or go back to a 15-member, instead of 54-member, council. They do not want a legislative authority, and if we accept their rejection of legislation, then we will have accepted that it is a nontransitional phase, that is, a final solution."

"Jerusalem may not be discussed—al-Sadat himself rejected the phased approach to negotiation, but he accepted a phased approach to implementation. So the negotiations are at a true deadlock, and the answer is to adopt a correct policy. What is this correct policy? We have two options today: either to go on the way we are going, or look for ways not to go on sinking into crisis."

"If the negotiations continue on the same basis and theory of tracks that we have been brought around to, there will be no way out of the crisis. We must do some new thinking. To those who are afraid, I say there is no room for fear, because the logic behind suggesting five years of a transitional phase is that they want to freeze the Palestinian question in order to divide the Arab region."

"The Arab region is prone to explosions and crises, and an Israeli era will begin. The solution is to confront the problem—that way, there is a way to thwart it. If we want to strive for a future, we must go back anew to resolve that the enemy is not Arab. It is not Jordan or Syria or Egypt, nor is it Iran. This is where the conflicts occur. No, the enemy is still Israel, and without this method, how can we conceive of a correct policy? We will all sink if we do not find bases for future relations not based on hostility. We must proclaim: no confederation with Israel, because that decision is not a Palestinian one, but one that concerns Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the Arabs. Priority goes to a confederal union with Jordan, because it exists, practically, in terms of history and our interests."

"Rabin decided to make the Palestinian people despair. He wants us to think that we will never get anything but what Israel decides. Rabin does not for one moment think of withdrawing from the West Bank. He wants to withdraw from Gaza, and he wants a solution in the Golan. In the West Bank, he wants to make us a minority in what he calls an Israeli-Palestinian confederation. Rabin sits at the table grudgingly, because global interests now require that the situation be pacified. 'Have a seat,' Rabin says, but he will not withdraw from the West Bank. Rabin wants a separate solution with Jordan and Syria so that he can annex the West Bank. Our misgivings in the negotiations are that we have no fixed principle except that we will not pull out of the talks. The fixed principle is the return of the land, withdrawal, not to let go of Jerusalem, and not to negotiate over land."

"This region is open to great events, and I would like to tell my brothers east of the [Jordan] river that the question of Nabulus concerns you just as it does us and as the future of

Amman concerns us. We must work together to think of a way out of this deadlock, particularly because the present negotiating logic is at an end. We must begin by mobilizing the people to adopt a new way based on bearing responsibility. I am proud to be a Palestinian. There is no Palestinian political decision, or Palestinian military decision, or a Jordanian decision. The decision is Arab. As a Palestinian, I must act to create this equilibrium. There is no child fleeing its mercy, and we have spared the Arab nation.

"Within three, four, or five months, the cards will be reshuffled. There is no fear of divergent opinions, because you find unanimous opinions only among the dead. We should be ready for what is to come."

Survey Shows Majority Want To Continue Talks

93AE0142A Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in Arabic
15 Nov 92 pp 20-21

[Article from Jerusalem: "No One Is Happy, and Some Are Mad; Supporters and Opponents of Talks Assess the Situation, Differ on Alternatives"]

[Text] Both Palestinian and Israeli radical opposition agree on withdrawal from the negotiations. But the two opposition camps are not equal. The Palestinian opposition is defending right, in principle, and the Israeli opposition is defending the wrongest wrong, because the Israeli government itself is defending what is wrong!

An opinion poll conducted by AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, the respected weekly magazine published in East Jerusalem, showed that 61 percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories supported the continuation of the current peace negotiations with Israel.

The survey, published Friday, 6 November, one year after the Madrid peace conference, included a random sample of 1,216 persons, indicated that the proportion of opponents of the peace process was 34.5 percent, with 5 percent expressing no opinion.

The magazine conducted a similar poll at the start of the peace conference last year, which showed a lower rate of support for the talks; it was 48 percent then, as against 46 percent opposing them.

The magazine said that the new poll, conducted late last month, occurred "under conditions that included the escalation of armed action between Israel and the Palestinians and the Lebanese, which must have had an upward effect on support for opponents [of the process]."

It added, despite that, that opposition had not gone beyond the decisive point, "which evidenced a Palestinian eagerness for peace."

That is as far as public opinion is concerned. What do prominent people in the occupied territories—whether members of the negotiating team, or opponents of the whole idea of the negotiations—think about the same subject?

FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH's correspondent in Jerusalem polled them:

- Engineer Mustafa al-Natshah, member of the Palestinian negotiating team: "There has not been, thus far, any basic progress in the talks, because the disagreement is still great between the Palestinian and

Israeli sides. Israel insists upon maintaining its control of the land during the transitional period, rejecting the principle of exchanging land for peace, and saying that the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 would be premature. How can progress be made in the talks?

"Israel is proposing the formation of an administrative council, meaning the authorization to perform administrative tasks. The legislative council that the Palestinian delegation is requesting means transferring power into Palestinian hands."

Lawyer Jamil al-Turayfi, Ramallah: "The Palestinian move to make peace is strategic, not a maneuver. The letter of invitation to the peace conference and the American letter of assurances mean that we are negotiating for a transitional period (autonomy) that must lead to the end of the occupation and the realization of Palestinian independence."

Zuhayrah Kamal, president of the Union of Palestinian Women's Working Committees and member of the leadership committee of the Palestinian negotiating team: "So far, none of the tracks of the the current negotiations have achieved any of the desired goals. The achievement, on the Palestinian side, has been that the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization has begun to expand gradually at the level of the administration of the talks, and its link to the Palestinian negotiating team is becoming clearer and clearer. Otherwise, the achievements realized have been so slight that we might call them nonexistent."

Dr. Riyadh al-Maliki, lecturer at Bir Zayt University (Opponent): "Our cause has not moved one step closer toward the desired solution. I see no signs or omens of positive change on the horizon for the near future, that would achieve the minimum demands of the Palestinian people."

'Ali Abu-Hilal, Abu-Dis, member of the Palestine National Council (Opponent): "The course of these negotiations, which began one year ago, confirms that the political process is leading to the goals set for them from the beginning. Successive events have exposed the falseness of the goal of achieving peace, security, and stability in the region. What is going on in the negotiations is the obtaining of a solution to the Palestinian question based upon the elimination of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and a solution to the refugee problem based upon settlement and nationalization—by turning them into minorities assimilated into the societies in which they live. I see a danger in the negotiations continuing; the Palestinian delegation should pull out immediately. I do not expect any essential change in the Israeli position in the seventh round."

Basman Abu-Rumaylah, journalist: "With the rounds of bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations, which have gone on for a total of 100 days, there has been no palpable progress in the peace process, because Israel has not complied with the UN resolutions."

"Rabin can keep his promises that he made on the eve of the Israeli elections in June, 1992. He promised that he would achieve "autonomy" for the Palestinians within 9 to 12 months after taking power in Israel."

Radwan Abu-'Ayash, member of the investment committee of the Palestinian negotiating team: "Our people's patience is running out, that is clear. Peace talks are not our choice, but there is no other way."

Lawyer Usamah 'Awdah, Bethlehem: "In the past year, nothing worth mentioning has been achieved, not only not between the Palestinians and the Israelis, but in any of the [negotiating] tracks. The negotiating process must be reformed, in order to make possible the safeguarding of Palestinian legitimacy, including the right of return, self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Pharmacist Ilyas Rashmawi, Bayt Sahur: "After a whole year of negotiating, it is Israel that has benefited. It has broken out of its international isolation. The Palestinian delegation should pull out of the talks. The whole Palestinian issue is the business of the United Nations."

Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, member of the administrative committee of the Islamic Medical Society in Gaza (Opponent): "The Palestinian delegation has achieved nothing at all. I may say that it has given and got nothing in return. I oppose these negotiations from their very basis. It is not permissible to confine the Palestinian cause to the portion of the Palestinian people that reside within Palestine and ignore the great majority, who are the sons of the diaspora."

Al-Haj Hashim Ata al-Shawa, president of the Bank of Palestine and president of Gaza's Federation of Citrus Growers: "The feelings of frustration that have overcome the Palestinians are attributable to Israeli obstinacy and disappointment in the position of the American administration, which has applied no pressure upon Israel. Without that pressure, there will be no progress."

Engineer Jamal al-Khudari, member of the Board of Gaza's Society of Engineers: "The mounting Palestinian demands for the withdrawal of the Palestinian delegation from the negotiations and repeated calls for the holding of a referendum on the benefit of participation, show the frustration at what the peace talks can yield. The expected results of the present negotiations will not materialize, not at all, given the scale of the concessions the Palestinian side has made."

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Turk, teacher at al-Najah University: "Things are not very different now from the way they were a year ago, at the Arab level or the Palestinian level, in particular, but we see a big difference between Israel's situation now compared to a year ago, and that difference is in Israel's favor. Internationally, Israeli policy was able to break the relative isolation it had suffered from because of the intifadah. There are many countries that have weight, that have recognized Israel and exchanged ambassadors to visit Israel. At the Israeli-Palestinian level, which is more important in the struggle, Israel has been able to get around the PLO in negotiating, substituting for it people from within [the territories]. That is what Israel wanted."

And us? We're always known for our incredible historical generosity!

If any transfer of power from Israel to Palestinian citizens in the West Bank and Gaza occurs, it will be due to the striking of the PLO from the political map. That is what Israel planned, and what America seeks.

Nusaybah Views Talks in Historical Context

93AE0136A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Tawfiq Abu Bakr]

[Text] Amman—Sari Nusaybah, member of the steering committee of the Palestinian negotiating delegation and leader of political committees in the occupied territories, believes that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are approaching a new dynamism. He believes that in order to conduct a positive evaluation of the negotiations that began a year ago in Madrid, distinction should be made between the peaceful political process in its wider context and the negotiations that have been going on for a year. The Madrid negotiations are one aspect of the political process and its latest manifestation, since the events and developments of the negotiations can be seen only within the context of the peaceful political process in general, which is the main background of these negotiations.

He said: "By peaceful political process I mean the interactions and changes taking place in the Middle Eastern political scene that determine or characterize relations between the Arab world and Israel. The June 1967 defeat can be determined as a basic starting point of those reactions. Since the end of the war, the Arab and Palestinian political scene, in particular, witnessed a wide range of reactions that have built up over many years. But seen in retrospective—if one may say so—they represented a gradual process toward the recognition of Israel or the Jewish entity as an inevitable fact, and an attempt to getting acclimatized to it. The conflicts, wars, and confrontations with Israel during all that period—including, of course, the intifadah, which at first seemed to be signs of the existence or the birth of a process of a counterdynamism—were simply feelings of shock and emotions that have eventually impacted the political process to which I referred, namely the peaceful political process."

Since the Security Council issued Resolutions 242 and 338—Article I of which provides for the establishment of an appropriate control for the implementation of Resolution 242, which, as is known, provides for the recognition of Israel and calls for negotiating with it—a number of border agreements were concluded in the early 1980's between Israel and Syria (the disengagement agreement) and between Israel and Egypt. These were followed by official agreements between Israel and Egypt within the framework of Camp David, and between Israel and Lebanon. All of these agreements were simply the result and the outcome of multiple deep reactions within the wider context of the peaceful political process. On the Palestinian side, this historical process interacted on several levels, by which I mean the peace process. These interactions became manifest in the gradual evolution of Palestinian criteria, concepts, stands, and slogans. In 1968, the concept of a Palestinian Arab state evolved into a new concept that was adopted by the Palestine National Council [PNC]. The new concept was that of a democratic secular state in Palestine in which the Muslims, Christians, and Jews coexisted. The concept takes into consideration the forced Jewish existence in Palestine. Then a new concept was adopted at the 12th PNC that was held at the Arab League in Cairo in 1974. The new concept gradually recognizes the new facts, namely, the concept of establishing a national authority on any part of the land from

which Israel withdraws. This further developed into the formula of the independent Palestinian state, a superior expression of the national authority within the context of the transitional concept. Further developments occurred in the 16th PNC with adoption of the concept of two states on the land of Palestine. In November 1988 the PNC announced the independence charter and launched the Palestinian peace initiative that is based, among other things, on Resolution 242. These gradual changes in concepts, stands, and slogans coincided with developments on the level of the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. This dialogue began in the late sixties between the Palestinian left and the Israeli extreme right (Matzen organization, the Communist party and others). It ended in the late 1980's with a dialogue between the central Palestinian trend and the central Israeli trend: Likud, the 'Amirav document, and others.

Moreover, the Palestinian scene witnessed a coincidence of official political developments in this field and in the wider Arab map. A number of attempts have been made to find a formula for an official direct negotiations between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. These included attempts that are known to the public and others that have been kept in the wraps of secret diplomacy. Attempts have also been made in the wider context, including, for example, those attempts made in the 1970's to ensure the success of the Geneva conference in the 1970's after the October war. These included the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement in the 1970's, James Baker's five points, and President Mubarak's 10 points. All of these attempts were part of a wider effort for direct negotiations. This went on until we reached the Madrid peace conference.

The most important conclusion that one can draw from all these developments on the Palestinian and Arab level is that a political process that is clear and defined was in launched and gradually progressed in different ways since 1967 and up to Madrid conference. The basis of which was admission of the 1967 defeat and the recognition of the balances of power and the fact that Israel exists. The framework of this is the resolutions relating to and resulting from that war, most of important of which are Resolutions 242 and 338.

Understanding this political and historical background of the Madrid negotiations is necessary to understanding the current negotiations more correctly. In other words, we can determine the position of these negotiations as part of the historical political process, by which it is influenced and influences others. Both sides interact with one another within the context of the process until its final and complete conclusion.

The ability to read the situation comprehensively means, among other things, the ability to foresee, even before the Madrid conference, the inevitability of direct negotiations between the two sides eventually, something that would be the logical crowning of the development of the political process. It is also the ability to predict that the negotiations were going to be difficult and complex. The goal of the process is to obtain the realistic maximum within the limits of the first stage of the talks and to shun raising false hopes about the outcome of the talks so that nobody will be disappointed when he sees what has actually been possible to reap.

I can say, if I were to make an objective evaluation of the negotiations progress and taking into consideration all the foregoing factors, that the negotiations have progressed the way they were expected if we were to take the objective facts involved into consideration, including what Israel is aspiring to achieve, on one hand, and the limits of what the United States wants to do or can do, on the other. All of which is based on the balance of power whose general outline was defined in June 1967 war.

If I were to be more precise regarding what I called the complex structure of the current negotiations and its relation to the wider political background, I could say that when the negotiations began it would have been possible—the fabricated media hullabaloo notwithstanding—to predict that the initial encounter would be an initial stage that will not bear fruit on the negotiations table. Rather, it would bear fruit on the wider political map that in turn would influence the negotiating table and so on, along the various stages. What we have actually seen on the Israeli side has been a slight change that has led to the defeat of the Likud and the coming to power of the Labor Party to administer the negotiations.

Sooner or later we will inevitably feel the effects of this on the progress of negotiations. We will see a new dynamism on this level, and so we must take into consideration the possibility that Israel will resort to some anticipated tactics aimed at bringing pressure on the Palestinian side. A new dynamism will eventually emerge that would push us toward more advanced positions. But the theory of progressing in stages will continue. The progress that might be achieved will come to a halt at a certain time, but changes and interactions will take place on the map and in the wider context. These changes and interactions are bound to impact the negotiations process and give it the necessary momentum to overcome the deadlock reached or the obstacles that cause the talks to halt at a certain point. The effects of all this will not be confined to the Israeli arena. Indeed, they could also involve the international situation and arouse world interest, which might lead to a more direct intervention, especially in the question of Jerusalem, which will be the biggest issue.

After one year since the official launching of peaceful interaction between Israel and the Palestinians, I am inclined to come to the conclusion that the fundamental political process has not reached its most complex stage. Despite the expected obstacles that might cause a temporary halt in the negotiations sometimes and that could develop into conflicts and clashes in the domestic scene, the current process will eventually lead to the signing of agreements and treaties that will be put into effect on the ground. I expect the maximum to be a kind of a confederation formula between Jordan and Palestine on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338. It should be taken into consideration that the key changes the Palestinian side has been able to bring about and establish through its struggle on the wider map are primarily represented in the position and role of the PLO and the importance and centrality of preserving the status of the independent Palestinian national identity. All that remains, in my view, will be some marginal historical issues relating to humans. These are of great importance, and on the Palestinian level, it could mean more giving and more sacrifices that need to be made to achieve the best possible results.

Abu-Sharif: Peace Process 'Hanging by a Thread'

PM2412111092 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 20 Dec 92 p 5

[Telephone interview with 'Arafat's adviser Bassam Abu-Sharif by U. De Giovannangeli; date not given]

[Text] "The peace process in the Middle East at this point is hanging by a thread. It is up to those forces in Israel that still believe in dialogue not to cut it. To these forces we say: In order not to kill all hope you must negotiate directly with the PLO. To carry on painting 'Arafat as the devil only benefits those in both camps who are opposed to the negotiations." These are the words of Bassam Abu-Sharif, Yasir 'Arafat's political adviser and one of the PLO's most authoritative leaders. We got through to him on the telephone in Tunis, following news that eight Palestinians had been killed in the Gaza strip.

[De Giovannangeli] Blood in the occupied territories again, the day after 400 Palestinians were deported to Lebanon. Is the dialogue season over for good?

[Abu-Sharif] It is difficult to talk of peace after the Israeli Government's latest acts: a deportation carried out in contempt of every international convention, and now the dead in Gaza. Young people, children, like Rana Abu-Tuyur, aged nine, killed while she was playing in the garden. To those who call for "moderation," we answer: Do not just defend the civil rights but also the lives themselves of the Palestinians in the occupied territories; force Israel to respect the UN resolutions forbidding all deportation from Gaza and the West Bank; bind the Israeli soldiers' hands; get the 400 Palestinians deported to Lebanon back to their homes. Only thus will my people be able to believe once more in the negotiations. Anyway, one thing is certain: the Intifadah cannot be "deported".

[De Giovannangeli] What is your overall judgment of the Rabin government's actions?

[Abu-Sharif] Well, we had hoped that the change of government in Israel would mark the beginning of a turning point in the Middle East peace process. Unfortunately, it has not turned out that way. We agreed to discuss transitional self-government for the occupied territories; the answer we were given was a reduced plan for administrative autonomy, completely divorced from UN Resolutions 242 and 338. And now, mass deportations and the killing of unarmed civilians. An ironfisted policy which, in reality, is akin to that pursued by the previous Likud-led governments. International public opinion gave enormous credit to Yitzhaq Rabin: The result is there for everyone to see.

[De Giovannangeli] At this moment, what would you say to the Israeli peace forces?

[Abu-Sharif] That the time has come to make a courageous gesture, the only gesture that can get dialogue going again: Recognize the PLO as a legitimate interlocutor in the negotiations. That is what the occupied territories' leaders have always asked, the same people Rabin is trying to counter the leadership in Tunis with. Despite everything that has happened, I invite Shim'on Peres, or any other Israeli minister who claims to be in favor of peace, to a meeting so that together we can prepare a summit between President 'Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin. We must do this before everything gets out of hand, before the extremist forces prevail in both camps.

[De Giovannangeli] And what can the international community do to stop this bloody spiral?

[Abu-Sharif] We ask for UN observers to be sent to Gaza and the West Bank immediately, in order to safeguard the lives of the Palestinian population under military occupation. It is the least they must do; it is essential if we wish to see the many UN resolutions which Israel has always refused to respect finally applied. No peace will ever be possible if the policy of "two weights and two measures" continues to be the rule in the Middle East.

[De Giovannangeli] Yasir 'Arafat has invited the leaders of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] to Tunis to discuss their admission to the PLO. How should we interpret this gesture?

[Abu-Sharif] In other words, you are asking me if there are no longer any political splits: No, they remain unchanged. But at this moment, faced with Israeli violence, the logic of unity prevails. Thus, I can use the words of one of the occupied territories' leaders: We disagree with the fundamentalists, but in these dramatic circumstances we cannot forget that they are all Palestinians, our brothers.

PLO Arranging Aid for Lebanese Camp Residents

93P40065A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
8 Dec 92 p 2

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned from informed sources that urgent Palestinian, Arab, and international contacts and consultations are now being conducted to provide immediate aid and relief to Palestinians living in southern Lebanon, in order to protect them from the difficult living conditions that they are experiencing.

The sources said that the Arab League General Secretariat will receive a report from the Palestinian representative to the league on the circumstances of the Palestinians, especially the women and children in the camps, and on the difficult living conditions. This is in order to organize operations to provide aid and relief.

At the same time, the sources mentioned that an urgent Arab report will be sent to UN Secretary General Dr. Butrus Ghali to explain these circumstances and request international assistance and an increase in the amount of international aid that must be provided to the Palestinian people in this matter.

Cairo sources affirmed that Arab contacts were made with Washington, Moscow, and Tel Aviv to stop the Israeli authorities' practices of repeated attacks on southern Lebanon, striking the Palestinian camps there, and retaliatory conspiracies against the the Palestinians in response to the escalation of the intifadah against the occupation authorities in the occupied Arab territories.

Furthermore, Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat has begun a series of immediate contacts at the level of the PLO and other factions to direct the greater part of available financial resources to raise the standard of living for those in the camps and protect them, especially with the coming of winter. This comes at a time which, sources indicate, 'Arafat will participate in many contacts with a number of Arab and European countries to help in this matter. This comes in the context of the report he received from Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Palestinian delegation's advisory committee.

Resignee Sees Talks as Contrary to PLO History

93AE0135A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
17 Nov p 6

[Interview with Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyah, former member of the PLO Executive Committee, a PLO founder, and a leader in the 1936 Palestinian revolution: place and date]

[Excerpts]

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Why did you decide to resign from the Palestine National Council [PNC], of which you have been a member since the first meeting was held in Jerusalem in 1964, and why did you do so as the political settlement is under way? [passage omitted]

[Abu Gharbiyah] Palestine in its entirety, from the sea to the [Jordan] river, belongs to us. But the others believe in gradual, step-by-step solutions. Those people act contrary to the Palestine National Charter, the PLO charter that provides that Palestine within its boundaries that existed during the British mandate is the home of the Palestinian people. This means that surrendering part of Palestine is out of the question.

This was proclaimed in 1964 at the first PNC meeting when the state of Israel already existed. I have been associated with the PLO and its charter since the beginning. I was one of its founders and a member of the first PLO executive committee. Recently I have felt that, because of the last PNC resolutions and the resolutions of the preceding one, the national charter is being abandoned, despite all of the statements to the contrary. The reality of the situation confirms such abandonment. When you accept Security Council Resolution 242, and when you negotiate on the basis of the letters of invitation [to the peace talks] and of the reassurances James Baker gave, then you are negotiating the recognition of Israel and handing over the land that was occupied in 1967. I regard this as an abandonment of the charter through which I was linked to the PLO and, therefore, I decided to resign from the PNC.

I would like to go back to the question of "phased struggle." I would say that in any political, military, or economic struggle in any aspect of life, the fruits should be reaped in stages. Struggle should be broken down into stages, but this idea should not be subverted the way we see it is being done now.

Surrender is not a phase action. We use the terms "tactic and phase." We can use the tactical phase when there is a balance of power or superiority of power is in our favor or there is hope for an imminent growth that in strength. But when the adversary's power is superior, then phased tactics are not in your favor; it becomes a retreat. When you retreat, then you are no longer able to advance on the road of "two steps forward for each step backward." This is surrender and not phased action. There are those people who believe we should salvage whatever we can of the West Bank and Gaza territories at this stage so that we can set up a Palestinian state, preparatory to retrieving all Palestine. This is not logical. The main reason for that is that we are weak. If the purpose is to retrieve what is left of the Palestinian territory in the long term, this is a correct stand. But if we want to plan for the long term we must not put obstacles on the road. The world is no longer a jungle. In any territorial dispute in the sea or on land between countries,

the world refers to the provisions of agreements in order to judge the dispute. When we recognize Israel's existence and its borders—God forbid—it will be difficult for the coming generations to deny these agreements. The world will not allow us to do so, even if we were strong, particularly because the powers of the UN forces are growing in today's world.

The current negotiations are not talking about the 1948 territories; they are not talking about Haifa and Jaffa. There is no more room for such talk.

Therefore, I am against concluding a settlement in the present circumstances. I would like to add that the current negotiations in theory are based on Resolution 242, but in practice they are based on James Baker's letters of assurance to the parties concerned on behalf of the United States. These are worded in a way that leaves the way open to overriding even Resolution 242.

Having talked about rejecting the settlement in principle, let's talk about the negotiations process. [passage omitted]

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Some people believe that the theory of future generations could be true if the Zionist existence in Palestine can be expelled eventually. But it is a colonization that is Judaizing the land daily, and time is not in our favor. What do you say?

[Abu Gharbiyah] The question of whether time is in our favor or not is indeed an important issue and is worth contemplating and studying. Here, I would like to criticize the brothers who are hurriedly measuring the future with today's reality yardstick. I would tell them that in 1936 we launched a revolution against the British empire on whose territory the sun never set. If someone came then and told us that this great empire would become a second rate power in 15 years' time, we would have laughed in his face and accused him of being crazy. But this was what has actually happened. I cannot imagine that Israel will remain so mighty and so strong, and I cannot imagine that Western support for it will remain with the same intensity and vigor, and I cannot imagine that disputes between the Arabs will continue. The immediately foreseeable future is not in our favor, but in the long run, the future is ours. Israel has been in existence for 40 years, and even if it remains another 40 years, its history will be only a drop in the ocean of time and the rise and fall of nations. [passage omitted]

Of course, I am optimistic about the future, although not the near future. We must not give Israel the chance to settle at this stage, and we must maintain the daily contact with it through the intifadah, the armed struggle, rejecting normalization, and maintaining the boycott. I have lived with the Jews in Palestine during the British mandate, and even then they were wondering how long they would be fighting and carrying arms.

After the October war, some Jews felt that it was impossible to continue living in Israel and fighting one war after another. So, counterimmigration by large number of people increased. It is true that Jews are settled in Palestine, but we also see Jews settled in Europe for hundreds of years. Still, they leave their countries to come to Israel. The opposite might happen one day.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] How do you evaluate the current negotiations, and what do you think of the Palestinian delegation's stands and performance?

[Abu-Gharbiyah] I have been against the negotiations, particularly against the principles on which they are based, namely the letter of reassurances and the letter of invitation. In the recent PNC—of which you, too, are a member and attended its debate—I asked brother Faruq Qaddumi, head of the political department, three times to provide us with a copy of the letter of reassurances addressed to the Palestinian delegation and to brief us on what happened during the last meeting between Faysal al-Husayni and James Baker, but, unfortunately, we got nothing. All that we had with us was the letter of reassurances addressed to Israel by the State Department as published in HA'ARETZ. Therefore, none of us in the PNC know what is it we have to approve. Only the leadership knows everything, but it did not brief us on the situation. I have rejected and still reject negotiations under the present conditions. I am not saying this out of nihilism. The PNC could have told us that we are prepared to enter into negotiations on the condition that settlements will be halted and on other conditions as well. In this case, either the negotiations would not be held, which I personally would prefer, or they would be held after some of our conditions are met. In this case, the situation would be different. Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi has been my colleague since the first PLO executive committee was formed. When I met him in Amman on his way to Madrid, he said if the settlements are halted in these adverse conditions, then this would have been an achievement. But this did not happen, and the settlements are continuing.

There are some people who approve of the negotiations in principle, but they mainly object to the way the negotiations are carried out. These include Ibrahim Bakr, who wrote a book on this matter, explaining the objections to the terms under which the talks are held, such as the refusal to allow Palestinians from outside the country to participate, the exclusions of Jerusalem, and others. Some people say we must accept whatever we can obtain, then develop a situation within the process itself. But what has been reaped from the process so far is still limited. There are some people who blame the faltering of negotiations on Israel, but this does not mean that the Israelis do not want a settlement. They do want it, but on their terms because they are in a position of strength and enjoy wide support. The Labor Party is more shrewd, and, therefore, it will seek to prolong the negotiations. They want a settlement that will comprise of autonomy for the local inhabitants and peace with the Arabs.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But Israel has two views: According to the first, it wants peace with the Arabs now while they are weak, and according to the second, held by the Likud, it believes that it should wait for several decades, by which time the Arabs will have accepted all of Israel's conditions because the land will have been Judaized and the inhabitants will have departed. For these reasons, they do not want peace now.

[Abu-Gharbiyah] If the Labor Party manages to obtain some kind of official (and not popular) Palestinian acceptance of autonomy on Israel's terms, this means a Palestinian declaration that the land belongs to the Israelis and that the Palestinians are a foreign community. This would be very

serious if it is realized. I say "if" because the possibilities are open. Since the beginning, the struggle has been over the land. How can we accept their sovereignty of Palestinian land. And if the Syrians accept Israel's stay in the Golan then we would be opening the way to Arab and Middle Eastern markets to them. This would be a great achievement for them. [passage omitted]

I reiterate once again that we are weak, and the negotiations are progressing in a sad and deplorable manner. But, nevertheless, I can see some bright spots; the first being the continuation of the intifadah, that, is the continued contact with the Zionist enemy. The second is that there is a change on the popular and national level. In other words, the Arabization and Islamization of the struggle in order to liberate Palestine which, throughout history, was never liberated by its people alone. Its liberation has always been the result of Arab and Islamic invasions. This is a bright spot on the national level. The third bright spot is that there are popular reactions to the attempts to brainwash the new generation through the media to accept coexistence with Israel as if it were a neighborly state. There are quite a few of those who accepted entering into negotiations but who are now having second thoughts and expressing reservations about them.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] But I have observed in the recent PNC something quite to the contrary. I saw some senior Fatah officials who were against the negotiations but who have now changed their views and joined the team supervising the negotiations.

[Abu-Gharbiyah] I mean the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], Nayif Hawatimah and others. Of course there is shifting from one camp to another, from rejection to acceptance and from acceptance to rejection, depending on several factors.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What about a popular referendum on any treaty reached, or holding a referendum now on the peace process itself?

[Abu-Gharbiyah] This is a complex issue, but let me talk about it. Any discussion of this issue might be perceived as subverting the authority of the PLO and its legislative and executive institutions. I must say first that the PLO, although it has deviated from its charter, it still remains the Palestinian people's legitimate leadership. I am one of those who have founded the PLO. The PLO has a fundamental role in the struggle, but at the same time I am not satisfied with its present policy, although I fully recognize its leadership's legitimacy. Do not forget that changing horses in midstream is unacceptable and not easy. It would call for an internal struggle, something that nobody is contemplating. What we wish for is radical changes to take place through the reorganization of the Palestinian home. This requires an agreement on the political situation.

Before the question of referendum, a rectification should be carried out in the PLO's position on all levels. If the Palestinian public opinion was fully satisfied with the PLO's policies and situation, nobody would be talking about a referendum. The PLO leadership is our leadership, but we are not satisfied with its policies. Changing horses midstream is unacceptable. What is to be done, therefore? The

PLO's situation should be rectified, and we should go back to the people's conscience and to what it wants deep in its heart.

Referendums are customary in all of the countries of the world. They are held even on issues that are far less important and critical than ours. But a referendum has its own constituents and is not an absolute matter. With Arab and financial pressures, it could lead to results contrary to what is expected. However, this does not mean casting doubts on a referendum in principle. If objective conditions and suitable terms are provided, it must be held. But the great danger lies in the referendum leading to the wrong results.

PLO Publication: Mixed Feelings on Confederation

93AE0171B Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 29 Nov 92 pp 1, 12

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haqq: "Palestinian Independence Challenged by Peres's Confederation and Rabin's Federation"]

[Excerpts] Israel said, with great difficulty, the "withdrawal from the Golan" word, even though it did not mean prompt withdrawal. It seems, however, to have the utmost difficulty saying "withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza," without counterproposals for an Israeli-Palestinian federation or even for a tripartite confederation that would include Jordan!

One of the characteristics of the current political process to resolve the Middle East crisis is that serious discussions and fruitful proposals take shape away from the negotiating table.

Serious discussions and numerous proposals took shape as soon as the Arab-Israeli bilateral talks concluded, to no result, as usual. Some of those proposals could be fruitful even though their direct objective, particularly of those advanced by Israel, is avoidance of peace process commitments.

It seems that Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, leaders of the ruling Israeli Labor Party, are reverting back to the role-assignment game or to a contest for advancing concepts and proposal with current or future themes.

Following his recent short visit to the Egyptian capital, Peres proposed a transition period of joint Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian territories. This seems like a variation on a proposal he advanced in the mid-1980's on Jordanian-Israeli "joint administration" of those territories.

This new, or perhaps modified, proposal that Peres articulated to the Israeli Knesset's External and Security Affairs Committee was perhaps intended as a message to Palestinian leaders as they prepared for another series of meetings. He outlined the outcome of his discussions with Egyptian leaders about joint Egyptian-Palestinian concepts that were developed during the Palestinian president's earlier visit to Cairo. One of his off-hand remarks seems to support this probability. He emphasized that a meeting between him and President 'Arafat is not currently in the cards, and he explained why it is not.

In short, the Peres proposal calls for dual sovereignty—Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian towns, villages, and camps, matched by Israeli sovereignty over the settlements. There would be joint sovereignty over official territories—land owned by the state. This, of course, is the format for a five-year interim solution.

This would seem to be an important step forward if we compare the Peres concept with the stance Israel has adopted since the beginning of the talks and through the seventh negotiating session. The Israeli position has been to discuss the status of the population, but not the land, during the transition period.

This particular point prompted brother Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Palestinian delegation's steering committee, to comment: "The Peres proposal deserves consideration."

On the other hand, if contrasted with the Palestinian position on the contents of the invitations to the Madrid talks, the proposal appears to be an attempt at evading the hard decisions that Tel Aviv must make if the political process is to progress towards its objectives.

Tripartite Federalism

On his part, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin picked the perfect time and the appropriate forum to again advance a concept to which he had casually alluded some two months earlier. In an interview 20 November with the French publication *OBSERVATEUR*, Rabin expressed confidence in finding a "solution based on a federation" between Israel and Palestine that Jordan and Syria could join at a later date. Egypt would be unable to join because the Sinai desert separates it from the aforementioned parties.

Rabin then detailed "new opportunities" for the Palestinians, pointing out that a Palestinian identity could exist without an independent state by taking on some other form such as a federal union. His previous remark on the same subject came on 22 September, when he told the Knesset's External and Security Affairs Committee something to the effect that "we should not discount the possibility of a solution based on a tripartite confederation."

Rabin's earlier remarks may have been meant, among other things, as a response, direct or indirect, to a 5 August interview given by Faysal al-Husayni, a Palestinian leader in the occupied territories, to Israel's *HA'ARETZ* in which he said that the establishment of a Palestinian state was an absolute condition for the creation of a confederation of Jordan, Palestine, and Israel.

By contrast, Rabin's more recent remarks seem more developed and more specific, even though they reflected definite retreat. His earlier proposal dealt with a confederation that would logically require three entities that would necessarily have to enjoy equal sovereignty. The second proposal dealt with a federation, which would open the door to the merger of a political entity into an independent sovereign state rather than a situation where three states would join together in creating a new, integrated, and sovereign union. [passage omitted]

It seems, then, that the concept is taking shape in Rabin's head, because he keeps adding detail to fill in the gaps in previous statements, from the Israeli viewpoint, of course. If the Rabin and Peres concepts were added together, we

would be able to discern the line of thinking of the Labor Party's leadership and its vision for the region's future and geopolitical map at the conclusion of the current political process.

The Rabin government, as indicated in the aforementioned interview, wishes to accomplish certain political objectives during its first year in office. It is willing to proceed with the self-rule plan, or the transition period, on the basis of the Alon plan and the reality of settlements there, in which the occupied territories would become cantons separated by sovereign Israeli extensions. Those cantons are to become, at a later date, a nation that enjoys self-rule, thereby vesting its people with a status slightly higher than Begin's recognition of the "cultural identity" of the people of the occupied territories. This nation would be united with Israel in a federation that would then enter into a confederation with Jordan, which may later be joined by Syria, and then by Lebanon, "when its economy improves and it is cleansed of terrorist groups." [passage omitted]

PCC Member Lists Peace Talks' Benefits

93AE0151A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 16 Nov 92 p 13

[Article by Palestinian Central Committee member Mamduh Nawfal: "Balance Sheet on First Year of Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations: Participating in Peace Process Has Saved PLO"]

[Text] We come to the results of the negotiations on the Palestinian side. Of course there is no unified Palestinian assessment of the results of the peace process because the Palestinian scene is essentially divided against itself over the very issue of participation. Nevertheless, there are a number of results and effects that, having been confirmed on the ground and in relations by the realities of life, can be assumed not to be the object of disagreement. Before beginning to present the results and impacts of the negotiating process on the Palestinian side, one must stress that there are many imperfections in the principles on which the peace process was based, including the division of the solution into two stages, transitional and final, and Israel's not pledging to halt settlement completely during the negotiations. But we must remember the balances of forces that prevailed at the outset of the negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the Palestinian cause and the PLO at the time, as well as the options and alternatives proposed at the time. One remembers that the PLO's declaration of agreement to participate in the peace process came several weeks after Syria and all the other Arab states announced their acceptance. The events of the political process have confirmed that the imperfections and gaps have not prevented the achievement of some gains and accomplishments for our people, our cause, and the PLO and that patience and wisdom in the negotiations are likely to fill the gaps and remedy the shortcomings that the letters of invitation and the assurances contained. These achievements include:

First, the Palestinian people have established their presence. They have filled the seats with a delegation of their own people who have sat face-to-face with their enemy in an international gathering aimed at dealing with the issue of their people and other problems of the region. This is the first time in the history of the Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict that Palestinians have been able to assert their existence and represent themselves by themselves. One can

therefore say that Palestinian participation has forever exploded the Zionist proposition based on denying the existence of any people with the name Palestinian. It has exploded forever the Arab tutelage and alternatives that usually were imposed on Palestinian representation. If there is unanimous international desire to make the peace conference a decisive stage in solving the region's problems and reordering its conditions, one can say that the Palestinian people have reserved their place in the new arrangements and headed off any attempt to efface and exclude them; they have not, as happened previously, lost the historical moment.

Second, the Palestinian delegation successfully presented and showed the justice of its people's cause. In presenting it, the delegation used modern language that today's world understands. It showed the Palestinian people's civilized face and their ability to deal with the new international reality and its demands. It did not beg for solutions, but made it clear that continued absence of a just solution will harm the interests of the region's peoples and of all peace-loving peoples. Thus it successfully communicated its people's message to international public opinion and all peace-supporting forces; having made its cause a matter of priority for international treatment and presented realistic solutions for it based fundamentally on international law, it set all parties face-to-face with their responsibilities.

By participating, the Palestinian people have been able to widen and strengthen their circle of friends, win over many neutral forces, and neutralize some forces that were hostile or virtually so.

Third, by participating in the Madrid conference and by the delegation's good performance of its tasks, one endorsed the unity of the people, the unity of the leadership, and the unity and independence of representation. True, Palestinian participation officially took the shape of a delegation of national figures from inside the country in the framework of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Yet it is also true that all of the conference's participants and observers know that the PLO is the real negotiator and that the Palestinian delegation was formed by decision of the PLO leadership. Anyone who wants to see the facts can easily perceive the independent Palestinian presence that the Jordanian side has continually strived to make visible. Anyone can perceive the delegation's continual insistence on endorsing the PLO as its sole source of authority. Its proclamation of this on all occasions has blocked every thought or fantasy about creating alternatives to the PLO.

Fourth, there is no doubt that Palestinian participation in the conference and the realistic, responsible positions that the delegation has taken have restored the PLO's credibility at the international level, following the distortion of its image during and after the Gulf war. Everyone knows that these positions came about with direct guidance from the PLO leadership and after their approval. Consequently, no reasonable being could imagine, for example, Israel's demanding of the Palestinian delegation that it make a decision to freeze all Palestinian military operations directed from abroad or taking place inside the country against Israeli economic and military installations. Everybody knows that the delegation's answer will be short and instructive: Discuss this and similar matters with Palestinian fighters, soldiers, and their command, the PLO. Thus

one can say that participating in the Madrid conference protected the PLO from effacement and destruction; it saved the PLO from the isolation and blockade that had been imposed on it; it showed the PLO leadership capable of shouldering its international peacemaking responsibilities; and it strengthened the PLO's position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Fifth, Palestinian participation in the peace process has opened new fields and issues of the conflict with the enemy. It has created better conditions for pursuing and developing the other forms of struggle in which the Palestinian people have been engaging for many years.

During the negotiating rounds, the intifadah has been able to acquaint the world with its goals and daily struggles. The cases of murder, repression, imprisonment, deportation, and so forth that the occupying army commits to confront the intifadah have been transformed from local matters to international political causes that force themselves on the negotiations. More than in the past, the intifadah has come to have people who bring it to the world, defend it, and show solidarity with it. Palestinian participation in the negotiations has provided broader political protection for the intifadah and has placed additional restrictions on Israel's moves to crush and terrorize. Mass transfer, for example, has become virtually impossible, and individual deportation has become a major international issue. Participation has opened international prospects for providing additional economic support for the people of the intifadah and support for Palestinian human rights.

National figures and personalities inside the occupied territories have been sanctioned as an extension of the PLO leadership, and this has been accompanied by the provision of a certain international political protection for these personalities.

Entrenching and widening this gain will certainly assist a serious start to building certain official cadres and institutions in the occupied territories.

Sixth, the issue of halting and freezing settlement has been transformed from a local issue into an major international one and has gained the attention of all participants in the peace conference. I think that Likud's departure from power is a gain and that the loans and settlement battle was a major reason for it. True, the Palestinian side with all its forces and skill could not force Israel to halt or freeze settlement completely, but Rabin's being forced to announce a halt to building new settlements and a building freeze for 7,000 housing units under construction can be deemed a gain that would not have been won had the peace process been boycotted. True, Rabin will continue building 11,000 housing units. Yet it is also true that the negotiations continue and that the settlement battle has not stopped.

The establishment of a transitional Palestinian authority will greatly facilitate embarking on this battle and realizing important achievements in it.

Seventh, Palestinian participation and the realistic policy followed by the PLO have helped enable the peace forces in Israel to strengthen their positions and have given them effective weapons for expressing their views. The presence of 12 Knesset members from an Israeli party that advocates two states for two peoples and the Palestinian people's right

to self-determination and that recognizes the PLO as the legitimate representative of this people certainly can be deemed a gain for the Palestinian cause, and its value increases even more when one takes into account the number of Labor Party doves who believe in these positions. The conflicts now raging among the Israeli parties over the peace process and the Palestinian issue have been taking place on the basis of Palestinian participation in the peace process.

Eighth, participating in the peace process clearly has caused increased unraveling of the fabric national unity. To understand this effect and the negative impact, one must stress that disagreement and division over participating in the peace process are natural and the expression of the healthy state of Palestinian thought. In the history of the Palestinian cause, the political process is an event that by its results will touch the national destiny as a whole; its political forces have the right to disagree and differ over it.

However, there is a good deal of specious blame and little objectivity of judgment in investing the political process with all responsibility for all the disagreements on the Palestinian scene. As everybody knows, the Palestinian scene has not witnessed political agreement since the mid-1970's. It has witnessed no political agreement throughout the period of the intifadah, before the American initiative and the peace conference, and after it. The disagreement with Hamas has existed since the first days of the intifadah. Differences with some of the other opposition forces over a position on Resolution 242, the declaration of independence, the Palestinian peace initiative, the 10 Egyptian points, and the five points proposed by Secretary Baker existed before the Madrid conference. Objectively, one must acknowledge that the present disagreement is the most severe and that its results could be more dangerous, especially if the disagreement deviates from its democratic domain and enters the byways of accusations and the labyrinths of intellectual and sometimes physical terrorism, and if Arab and Islamic forces become involved. The experiences of the Palestinian national movement over the last quarter century have confirmed that all Palestinian disagreements, even the most complex, can be solved and treated easily as long as they remain Palestinian in basis and Palestinian in motives and inception. They have confirmed at the same time that the simplest and smallest issues of disagreement can turn into impenetrable concrete barriers if they have Arab links and dimensions.

Disagreement and difference over the peace process doubtlessly will increase as the negotiations progress. It is no exaggeration to say that Palestinian democracy and Palestinian political thought will embark in the next few months on a fateful experiment in which the conditions of success are available—the experiment of building an equation based on putting the national interest above any other considerations, an equation that enables the Palestinian opposition to express its opinion by all democratic ways and means, that makes it possible to preserve the gains and achievements realized to date and work to develop them, and that makes it possible to continue positive engagement with the peace process in accordance with the decisions of the legitimate Palestinian authority. Will the experiment succeed?

Rejectionists Demand 'Final' Withdrawal From Talks

JN2412105192 (Clandestine) Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic 1730 GMT 23 Dec 92

[Excerpts] The 10 Damascus-based Palestinian factions have issued the following statement:

The commands of the 10 Palestinian factions held a meeting on 22 December 1992. During the meeting they discussed the latest political developments and the exacerbating situation resulting from the brutal war being waged by the Zionist enemy against our people in light of the current negotiations. This war has culminated in the deportation of hundreds of our people's strugglers from the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Islamic Jihad movement. [passage omitted]

Under the current delicate and critical circumstances, and as a result of their national and historic responsibility, the 10 Palestinian factions will fully play their role. They are eager to deny the Tunis [PLO] leadership the opportunity to exploit the deportees issue in an attempt to revitalize its role, having persisted in the policy of relinquishment along the Madrid- Washington path by offering a series of free concessions. The commands of the 10 factions consider it a good opportunity to take a firm and clear position on the question of negotiations through an immediate withdrawal from the negotiations, and by not being satisfied with a suspension of participation, as this constitutes a new deceptive policy by the Tunis leadership. For now, the negotiations have been automatically suspended, pending the arrival of the new U.S. Administration. The recent overall developments necessitate the rehabilitation and rectification of the situation in the Palestinian arena along a clear and constant political line. This should be accomplished through a commitment to national constants, unanimous Palestinian resolutions, bolstering our people's unity, and achieving a comprehensive national unity as we confront the genocide being waged by the Zionist enemy.

The Palestinian factions affirm the constants of their position on the basis of the following points:

1. There should be a declaration of an immediate and final withdrawal of the negotiating Palestinian team from the ongoing negotiations. The Tunis leadership is required to declare such a decisive stand and to end the farce of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. It should not be satisfied with suspending the Palestinian participation in the negotiations. Such a suspension is aimed at curbing the escalating popular Palestinian rise against the Madrid-Washington march. They call on other Arab parties to show solidarity with the Palestinian demand to halt negotiations and effect a final withdrawal from them.

2. Our people's unity inside and outside the occupied homeland should be bolstered. The factions call for struggle to achieve a genuine national unity based on the national Palestinian constants, safeguarding the PLO and its achievements, and giving up the destructive, divisive policy adopted by the Tunis leadership, a policy which has gravely harmed Palestinian struggle. This requires the following steps:

- A. All efforts and capabilities must be mobilized to support the popular intifadah, guarantee its continuity and escalation of its activities, and to develop the methods of Palestinian struggle on various levels, particularly armed struggle.

- B. A large-scale campaign on Arab, Islamic, and international levels must be launched to turn the deportees issue into an Arab, Islamic, and international issue and thus expose the enemy policy and its schemes, to obstruct the coming deportation scheme, and not to give the Tunis leadership the opportunity to exploit the deportees issue.

Within this framework, the Palestinian forces appreciate the stand of the Lebanese Government, people, and national and Islamic forces. They hail all the stands of solidarity that have been showed by brotherly and friendly Arab and Islamic forces in the world. In this context, the 10 factions appeal to all Arab and foreign states, forces, establishments and the international community to move swiftly to put various forms of pressure on the enemy to make it implement UN Security Council Resolution 799 and to accept the return the deportees to their homeland.

The 10 factions will continue to follow up current developments. They stress their eagerness to continue to develop their joint work. They have decided that their meetings will be continuous and open to allow the required measures to be taken and decisions made regarding the overall developments in the Palestinian arena. [passage omitted]

Analyst Predicts Violence in Self-Rule Interim

93AE0143A Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 9 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Khalid al-Hurub: "Preventive Reading of Shape of Relationship Between Authority and Islamists During Coming Stage of Palestinian Self-Rule"]

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted]

The preventive discussion that these lines convey is based on hypotheses that will be stated. These hypotheses are not unrealistic. Indeed, daily events and a continued reading of Palestinian developments inside Palestine and abroad uphold them, and many phenomena that need no demonstration support them. These hypotheses are the following.

First Hypothesis

The first hypothesis is based on many international and regional political data, such as the new world order and the extinction of foci of tension: The Arab-Israeli negotiating process that began in Madrid in October 1991 is bound to end in agreements of some kind between the various parties, including the Palestinians. It seems likely that this will take the form of what is being discussed in regard to the concept of administrative self-rule, with some disagreement about some details. This period will last for five interim years. Afterward, a transition will occur to a form of final solution, if many matters are settled during this transition period. It seems that the actual establishment of this form (administrative self-rule) is only a few months down the road.

This hypothesis entails a number of dangers. First, the self-rule authority, whether elected or appointed, will be in the hands of one of many rival Palestinian groups—rivals sometimes to the point of mutual fighting and killing. The group will be the one that took upon itself the responsibility of promoting the settlement process from the time of the

1988 meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in Algeria, while other currents (some within the PLO, others, such as the Islamic forces, outside it) took a position utterly opposed to the idea of a peaceful settlement. This divergence has continued to widen. Now it has climaxed in the form of a real split in Palestinian ranks inside and outside the country regarding the negotiations and their potential results. The consensus is that these results will be self-rule, with disagreement about the extent of its powers. Supporters see these as great; opponents see them as weak and not worth discussing.

Second Hypothesis

The second hypothesis is that one of the groups—it will be Fatah, the main current supporting the negotiating process—will assume governing authority. The other groups—the most important of them will be the Islamic Hamas movement, particularly now that it has announced its position of not participating in any elections related to self-rule—will remain in the shadows. This division of governing authority and opposition, coming against a gloomy background of relations based on mutual mistrust, friction, and conflict to the point of bloodshed (for example, the recent events of July and October 1992 in the Gaza Strip) carries in itself the seeds of danger and violence. The future self-rule authority, as the agreements will stipulate, will have to control internal security, end "violent acts," and protect the tranquility of the settlements and settlers who remain in parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, the other side, utterly opposed to self-rule and the settlement, will be waving the flag of continued struggle and jihad against the Zionist presence in all its forms. These slogans and actions, which before the implementation of the self-rule period were classified as a kind of quarrel between parties in a single camp, will become a quarrel between a new governing authority and a powerful opposition. The quarrel will not be amenable to debate if the opposition continues to practice pre-self-rule convictions and methods such as military operations. In the eyes of the ruling authority this would mean a clear violation of binding agreements. It would mean loss of popularity and of international confidence in its control of conditions inside the new entity.

The first friction between the two sides then will arise. It could lead—God forbid—to the choice of the method of force, repression, and exchange of bullets. The opposition in the end will pay a high price (so stipulates the unhappy Arab paradigm), but the real enormous price will be paid by the people as a whole, the country, and the other great common denominators.

Third Hypothesis

The third hypothesis is that the Palestinian self-rule authority will be concerned to the furthest extent with convincing the Israeli government, on the one hand, and the United States and Russia, the settlement sponsors, on the other hand, that it is worthy of trust and responsibility and of moving to a final solution after five transitional years. It therefore will countenance no disturbance of security.

The hard question that all sincere persons now must answer who do not want the Palestinian case to fall into the toils of the unfortunate Arab paradigm of collision is how such a

collision can be avoided. How can disagreements and relations between governing authority and opposition henceforth be regulated in a civilized manner that excludes repression and mutual violence? How can the real intellectual and theoretical effort of such sincere persons be made prominent today, not tomorrow, assuming that the prevention-is-better-than-cure theory really has upholders and supporters on the political and intellectual scene?

A grave implication of the hypothesis that Palestinian self-rule will be implemented against the background of popular and political division on the question is that the Palestinian social fabric will fragment: ascendant groups that benefit from the new governing authority will form, and groups that reject it will become isolated. Those who follow daily Palestinian developments know the preparations now under way in the West Bank and Gaza for the coming authority. Thousands of youthful Fatah supporters are preparing to join the "army" of the Palestinian police—its numbers, it is said, may reach 20,000—to keep order with an iron hand. Dozens of development, economic, and information institutions are announcing themselves and their officials, so that they can assume responsibilities. There are high councils on health, education, the judiciary, etc. They are forming without waiting for administrative or legislative elections. All this is happening among supporters and backers of the theory of settlement. Their idea is that because they brought the cake, anyone who did not help bring it has no right to share it or even taste it.

Such a situation will produce an Arab society exactly like other traditional Arab societies, with power divided among narrow circles of influence, while there extend broad sectors of the people and the masses that do not know what is happening. This model will imbed itself more strongly because of the existence of a wide-scale Islamic opposition and because of the difficulties of growth and start up. There will be a desire for the fledgling authority to grow in strength and force and make large strides on the road to founding and building up the community and the economy. This can take place only by relying on powerful funders and supporters, and this by itself will lead to isolation of the ruling authority from its people and masses and to deviation from the collective goals of the masses. Whereas goals before self-rule concentrated on steadfastness, resisting the occupier, and liberation, under self-rule goals will become fragmented. The opposition's goals will narrow in scope to self-preservation for fear of repression and banishment and to maintaining distinctive positions. The ruling authority, too, will feel constant danger from a strong opposition. As a result, the goals of entrenching the ruling authority, maintaining respect for it, and imposing its will will become ends that absorb great efforts, while the constellation of goals shared by the masses and popular sectors will become confused. New models of consumption and economics will impose themselves. Broad sectors of the masses will fear being hit by cross fire from the battle between ruling authority and opposition. Major goals, such as recovery, rebuilding, achievement of economic wealth, and building a cohesive and distinctive community with an identity will weaken.

Fourth Hypothesis: Israel's Clever Role

This hypothesis centers on the policy of Israel's prime minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, known for his great shrewdness

and cleverness, compared to his predecessor Yitzhaq Shamir. Whereas Shamir confronted by himself all the Arab and Palestinian parties, Rabin thinks he should withdraw a little from the arena and leave his adversaries room that they will fill by fighting each other. In Palestinian terms, he will implement the policy by showing some sort of flexibility toward parts of the West Bank on which a self-rule authority is slated to be established and by taking a step back. This withdrawal will cause a partial power vacuum out of which intra-Palestinian fighting will develop to fill it. This internal fighting, which will be fed as long as possible during the five transition years, will realize a number of vital goals for Rabin: First, it will make the Palestinians appear before the world as an uncivilized people who do not deserve power and cannot be trusted with it; transition to the phase of a final solution thus will be impossible. Second, it will produce a tremendous amount of frustration and despair among the masses and sectors of the Palestinian people because of the internal fighting. The level of bitterness will increase to the point of wanting a return of Israeli occupation, a situation easier to bear psychologically than a state of internecine fighting. Rabin in this way will also achieve the destruction of the stubborn persistence of the intifadah, military action, and all the currents and organizations that continue working to strike at the Israeli presence. The matter will cost him no security reinforcements in Palestinian cities and camps and no army presence in them; rather, one can assume that it will be done by Palestinian hands in accordance with the provisions of the agreements.

If these hands succeed in their task, Rabin will be rid of a continuing conflict. If they do not succeed, Rabin will be rid of the entire subject of a settlement, final solution, etc.

Phenomena and Environments

A number of phenomena and environments support the above hypotheses. First, there is the deep political disagreement between the pro-settlement current in the PLO, the current of the future ruling authority, and the current of Hamas and the Islamists generally, the current of the future opposition. This disagreement finds expression in violent political behavior that abandons the language of dialogue and turns to the language of violence and liquidation. Violence by the opposition in confronting the pro-settlement current (it has not reached the point of assassination yet) and liquidation of opposition figures by the pro-settlement current (the attempted liquidation of the main force of Hamas in Gaza in July 1992)—this violence, rivalry, and friction on the everyday scene in fact are preparing sufficient ground for the growth of a violent relationship of conflict when the balance of forces within the country breaks to the advantage of one force, given the absence of the language of dialogue. What is so strange, surprising, and objectionable is that interest in intra-Palestinian dialogue is not a hundredth—nay, a thousandth—of the interest in Palestinian-Israeli dialogue or even in Palestinian-American dialogue. The effort being made to unify the domestic scene or settle its disagreements is really a big zero.

Another phenomenon and environment working to produce a relationship of violent conflict is the availability of large amounts of backing for the Islamists from Islamists of surrounding countries and the world Islamic movement. Sometimes the backing goes no further than media and

propaganda support, but it is of great importance, particularly as a movement like Hamas considers itself an extension of the international Islamic movement and an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.

Required Preventive Effort

The picture that the preceding lines have drawn may be dark, but personally I do not think it is far from the reality. Pessimism in forecasting such things will push in positive directions and stimulate the finding of preventive steps. Misplaced optimism, on the other hand, will lead to laxity and waiting for events to take their course. As usual, pens will begin late in the day to condemn one party or the other, and they will analyze and clarify when the train has already pulled out of the station.

In the Palestinian case, the effort needed to head off the danger of the unhappy paradigm of a clash between ruling authority and Islamists requires broad cooperation among intellectuals and people concerned and interested in the welfare of the entire nation. It requires agreement on common denominators on which parties can unite no matter how far apart their viewpoints may be. This effort could translate into an independent grouping of a large number of ulema, intellectuals, politicians, and journalists. It would meet under the slogan, "Saving Palestinian blood before it is spilled." It would work to defuse conflict, bridge differing visions, and regulate the relations of parties with each other. This grouping must launch out from its Palestinian circle toward the Arab and Islamic scene, because these two dimensions form the heart of the extended consciousness and hope involved in this cause. This would mean in one form or another raising the slogan of "Arabizing and Islamizing" the Palestinian problem, so as to impose upon all the Palestinian parties what this grouping arrives at through gradual solutions and undoing the foundations of the model of bitter conflict.

This effort is really a pan-Arab and Islamic issue. Its aim is to overcome a real crisis we face in our countries. It aims at creating an experience that passes beyond the stage of repression and creating positive climates at the level of the Arab world through exchanging ideas and proposals that meet and compete at the theoretical rather than the physical level.

All the writers and interested people who have tried sincerely to analyze and discuss the many clashes between ruling authority and Islamists in various countries and have proposed formulas for solutions should give an early reading of the Palestinian case. At this specific time they should turn to early preventive advice, before a new episode is added to the continuing story of the sad Arab tragedy. Arab, Islamic, and unity centers of research and study should shoulder their responsibilities in this matter.

Above all, the PLO, with its central group Fatah, and the Palestinian Islamists, with their main group Hamas, should sense the danger of the future phase and feel the trends of pain and hope within the Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic consciousness—a consciousness that can no longer tolerate further bloodshed. The two should meet and deal with an emergency situation through continued dialogue to get through this phase and save Palestinian blood before it is spilled.

Deportation Seen Creating Unprecedented Situation

TA2412185992 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic
24 Dec 92 pp 1, 11

[Editorial: "Important Moves"]

[Excerpts] These days the region is witnessing extremely important maneuvers that will determine the characteristics of the region and outlines for the peace process, which all observers agree has been dealt a mortal blow by the Israeli Government. [passage omitted]

At a news conference in Jerusalem, Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Palestinian negotiating team, and Dr. Hanan 'Ashrawi, the delegation's spokesman, stated that the Palestinian negotiators will not return to the negotiating table as long as Israel does not submit to international legitimacy and hastens to implement Security Council Resolution 799 that calls for the safe and speedy return of the deportees to their homeland.

It is clear now that deportation has created a new and unprecedented situation in the region. If the international community does not hasten to adopt appropriate and firm measures to force Israel to adhere to the Security Council resolutions, it will draw a dismal picture of the region for the coming years after having buried forever the dreams of peace by the region's nations.

The United States, which is the sponsor of the peace process, should quickly take one practical step to corroborate its statements on rejecting the deportation. It should stop using a double standard policy toward identical issues. Washington's continued practice of this policy will end its role as honest broker in the peace talks, making it a partner in burying the peace process.

Editor Views Collaborators' Role in Interim

93AE0152A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 22 Nov 92 p 8

[Commentary by Yasir Za'atirah, editor in chief of the Hamas publication FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH: "Killing 700 Collaborators Has Not Eliminated Phenomenon of Agents"]

[Excerpts] Many people are astonished to hear reports of people who collaborate with the Zionist occupation who are murdered by their Palestinian brothers. Their astonishment increases when similar reports are repeated, giving the large numbers of these collaborators, especially because this issue is being subjected to Zionist media scrutiny, in order to suggest that the problem is an internal, Palestinian one by saying that more are being killed in this way each day than are killed by the occupation. What is the background of this phenomenon? Is it unique to the Palestinian community? What is the role that the collaborators have played, and are playing, with the occupation in the past, present, and future, especially in the period that will come after the establishment of self-rule?

At the outset, one must say that collaborating with the occupation is a universal phenomenon, found everywhere that occupation exist and where there are plans to resist that occupation. All revolutions in the world—without exception—have known this phenomenon. The only distinction is according to the type of occupation, its intelligence, racism,

and capabilities, more than the type of revolution and the nature of the people, despite the fact that these issues influence the size, extensiveness, and reflections on the reality of this phenomenon. [passage omitted]

After the 1967 occupation, many Palestinian workers found that the territory occupied in 1948 was the appropriate place to obtain work because ways of making a living in their areas had narrowed, on one hand, and because the higher wages paid in Israeli workshops and factories were not available in those areas, on the other. Tens of thousands of workers went to the 1948 areas seeking work. A large percentage of them were young men who had had no opportunities for education.

Accordingly, the campaign began of forcing the young men to collaborate with the occupation by means of sex, narcotics, and money. The phenomenon began to increase little by little. The circles of these fallen young men began to expand in Palestinian society, until they reached the schools and universities. A parallel form of this phenomenon emerged with village mukhtars and notables who collaborated with the occupation. This group was exposed, but it feared no one. On the contrary, it became a link in a chain between the people and the occupation, facilitating business dealings by bribery and commissions, with the occupation's knowledge. The occupation authorities reached the point, at the end of the 1970's, of proposing a plan of village leagues, exploiting these notables as a kind of self-administration for the Palestinian community. That project soon collapsed, but the role of these collaborators continued to flourish.

However, the Zionist philosophy with regard to agents has no limit. Operations to subvert people continue without ceasing. Moreover, agents have begun to play another important role, which is to spread vice in the Palestinian community so that it will lose its cohesiveness vis-a-vis the occupation and become satisfied with the status quo. The fact is that this role is the most dangerous, because the community could lose its will and balance and become a tasty morsel for the occupation. [passage omitted]

As we have said, there is no doubt that operations to eliminate collaborators are accompanied by big problems that lead to the killing of innocent people. This is because some have used this issue to square political and class accounts. We have seen how certain factions issue statements, in which they state that so-and-so, who was killed on a charge of collaboration, was an honest man from their group.

These problems have created a state of anxiety inside Palestine, which has prompted some to demand an end to the operations to eliminate collaborators and to find a formula that would end this phenomenon and not make it subject to the whim of influential persons in certain factions. However, those calls, which were issued by high-level leaders of Palestinian action at home and abroad, were not heeded by those active in the intifadah at home, especially those groups who were known as hunters. They are the ones most burned by the collaborators' fire.

The hunters' insistence on eliminating collaborators increased with those persons' emergence in dirty roles at certain times, represented by carrying out operations to liquidate their brothers or defaming them. It has been proven that certain collaborators worked with Israeli secret

units, which specialize in tracking down intifadah activists, and carry out many murder operations. Some collaborators are fully protected by the occupation, which has established camps for them in which they live with their families, as is happening in Fahmah Camp. [For a profile of Fahmah Camp, see JPRS report JPRS-NEA-92-137 of 16 October 92: "Press Center Interviews 'Collaborator Camp' Residents"] About 1,000 persons live in this camp, which the occupation prepared for them. It is an experiment that the occupation is working to repeat, in order to protect its agents.

The killing of 700 collaborators, so far, has not completely eliminated this phenomenon, inasmuch as it is still preoccupying the Palestinian factions, especially the group of hunters from Fatah's Black Panthers Group, Hamas's 'Iz-al-Din al-Qasam squads, and the Popular Front's Red Eagles Group.

Next Stage

Perhaps, it would be difficult to determine the number of persons collaborating with the occupation. However, it is known that the number is in the thousands, and the question now revolves around the expected role of these people in the coming stage, i.e., the stage after autonomy, especially the group that has not been exposed, which is either working within the factions or outside of them.

In this regard, one can look at the role of these persons through several perspectives, most importantly:

- The fabrication of a clash among the competing Palestinian tendencies inside the occupied territories because of the existence of strong opposition to the form of administrative rule proposed. It is well known that one of the Zionists' political goals, during the so-called transitional period, is to establish that the Palestinians are not qualified for a greater form of self-administration. This goal will be achieved by getting Palestinians to fight one another, which will allow the Zionists to tell the world that the Palestinians are not yet ready for this form. Some of them will kill others. This will be accomplished by getting some collaborators into the Palestinian police and having them track down the dissenters, causing chaos in the Palestinian community and bringing forth those who will demand a return to the old situation.
- Another form of collaboration with the occupation in the next stage is resuming the role that collaborators played before the intifadah. This role was to dissolve the Palestinian community and rob it of its values, customs, and conservative traditions so that it would accept the new situation, be absorbed into it, and not think about changing it. This is the role they played so well in the past, and there are bigger opportunities for success in this stage, in which the Palestinians believe that they will come out from under the pressure of occupation to freedom and self-liberation.
- Another issue may form an important role for the collaborators, especially the group of mukhtars, notables, and wealthy. This issue is represented by their role as middlemen for the Zionist enemy, as bridges for the enemy to cross into the Arab nation that, at least at first, will not accept the naked Zionist face.

Therefore, there is a need for middlemen and intermediaries to play this role. The collaborators are ready to strike by working on the foreign level and achieving large material gains!

One must be on guard against the role that these collaborators will play in the coming stage, because the solution that the current negotiations will reach will certainly not be the end of the world. It will only be one round in the dispute. Our defeat in this round does not mean that we have to prostrate ourselves completely before Zionism's will.

Report Details Poor Conditions in Southern Gaza

93AE0152D Jerusalem AL-TALI'AH in Arabic
12 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Wajih Abu-Zarifah: "7,000 Citizens Living in the Middle Ages"]

[Excerpts] This was our thought when we went to the al-Fakhari area of the southern Gaza Strip, where the authorities have recently demolished 20 homes and are threatening to destroy another 200 houses. This area reflects a story of confrontation that has not been concluded, where modest aspirations and dreams of a warm, clean home were changed into a pile of rubble in moments.

This area was created and formed as one of the offshoots of the difficult housing crisis in southern Gaza Strip and the fantastic rise in land prices. Some fled outside the municipal boundaries of Rafah and Khan Yunus, bought land, and built houses. At first, the authorities granted building permits and were not very strict. However, after 1973, no building permits were issued for that area. After many people had waited in vain for a long time for permits, the adventurers built anyway, using everything they had earned from the sweat of their brow and whatever they had saved from their children's basic expenses. [passage omitted]

But, how do these people live?

Sami Abu-Khammash said: "I moved temporarily into my brother's house. There are now 17 of us crammed into three narrow rooms that lack water and electricity. The only alternative is for my family to live in a tent."

The sword of destruction is still a nightmare, demolishing the beds of 200 families in this area, which has a population of 7,000. We should note that the area is deprived of water and electricity (despite the fact that lines pass through the vicinity and the population is prepared to pay the extension costs). There are no social institutions (clubs or nursery schools), no health amenities, not even an ambulance.

One citizen said: "The water problem is one of our most complex issues, since we are forced to transport our needs on the backs of donkeys over long distances. We are forced to plant our land with plants that need no irrigation, such as almond trees."

What about education?

There is a school for the elementary and preparatory stages. About 1,000 pupils study there, but it is also without water or electricity. After the preparatory stage, many leave school because the secondary schools are far away.

What can we hope for from the municipalities of Rafah and Khan Yunus, and from national institutions and agencies? Are they concerned about us and will they transport us from the Middle Ages?

'Black Panther' Gives Views on Israelis, Talks

93AE0149C Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic*
8 Nov 92 p 12

[Interview with a Black Panther by Khalid Abu-Ta'mah by YERUSHALAYIM of Israel: "If the Black Panther Could Talk!"]

[Text] Ahmad al-Daqqah of 'Arabah is a former student at al-Najah University and is considered by Shin Bet as a leading "Black Panther" in the Janin region.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Ahmad, how many collaborators with Israel did you kill?

[Al-Daqqah] I did not personally kill even one person. I only questioned suspects.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Shin Bet says you killed?

[Al-Daqqah] It is not true. Shin Bet accuses me of a lot of things I did not do.

[YERUSHALAYIM] What is it that you did, then? [Al-Daqqah] I fought soldiers and Israeli undercover units [must'arabun]. I fired several times in their direction.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Don't you fear for your life?

[Al-Daqqah] Why should I be afraid? I realized the moment I opted for this course that I would be killed one day. I am talking with you at this moment, but I could be dead within half an hour. I know that Shin Bet wants to liquidate me, and there were attempts on my life, but I will kill as many of them as possible before they succeed in killing me.

Shin Bet says that Burhan Subayh heads the Black Panther organization in Kafr Ra'i. The cell he leads is called the "Unit of Martyrs"

[YERUSHALAYIM] Don't you dread self-rule?

[Subayh] No, I approve of any agreement the representatives reach, provided they follow PLO instructions and keep within the framework of Palestinian national interests.

[YERUSHALAYIM] What do you think of Faysal al-Husayni and Hanan 'Ashrawi?

[Subayh] I respect them both as patriots.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Do they represent you?

[Subayh] Sure. They do not act on their own but they receive their instruction from the PLO, which represents me and all the Palestinians.

[YERUSHALAYIM] You claim to support the peace process, but you kill and carry out operations. Where is the logic in that?

[Subayh] Faysal al-Husayni and Hanan 'Ashrawi struggle at the negotiating table, and I fight here in Janin. All of us fight for the same objective, which is to drive Israeli occupation off our land.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Are you afraid of the Israeli undercover units?

[Subayh] Whoever embarks on this course does not fear death. We are aware of their attempts to arrest us or liquidate us. My finger is always on the trigger, and I will shoot the moment I encounter them.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Are there moments of regret when you say to yourself that the time has come to lay down your weapon and return to normal life?

[Subayh] As I said before, we, the fugitives, are proud of what we do and will never regret our actions. This is our patriotic duty because we believe in the justice of our cause.

[YERUSHALAYIM] What job would you like to have under a Palestinian government?

[Subayh] Any job that the PLO designates for us.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Burhan, if you were to meet tomorrow with Israeli Government representatives, what would you say to them?

[Subayh] Let us put an end to bloodshed.

[YERUSHALAYIM] But you are the one Israel accuses of bloodshed.

[Subayh] History will decide who is to blame for the bloodshed. Are we also accused of shedding blood in Sabra and Shatilla?

Israel still sheds Palestinian blood, even as the peace talks continue.

[Abu-Sanad, a member of the Black Panther cell] As long as Israel continues to oppress the Palestinian people, I ask the PLO to lift all restrictions on the activities of armed cells in occupied Arab territories. That way it would be possible to arrive at a cease-fire agreement with all parties, not just one.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Have you ever met an Israeli?

[Abu-Sanad] Yes, several times.

[YERUSHALAYIM] If an Israeli came to Kafr Ra'i right now, how would you react?

[Abu-Sanad] It would all depend on the man and the purpose of his visit. I have met Jews in the past, and I respected them and helped them all here in Kafr Ra'i. Compare this to what they do with the Palestinians in Tel Aviv and other places. Take the slaughter of Arab workers in Rishon LeZiyyon, for instance.

[YERUSHALAYIM] Does this mean that Jews can wander in Kafr Ra'i without fear?

[Abu-Sanad] With the exception of Israeli undercover units. Extremists came from America and Russia to settle on our land, and this we cannot accept. The objectives of the squads are known. They come to the village to shed blood, murder, arrest, level homes, and pull out trees. We are entitled to resist such squads with anything we have, from stones to live ammunition. I would like to emphasize, however, that we never touch a Jew who comes here for an obvious [legitimate] purpose.

[YERUSHALAYIM] If Yitzhaq Rabin, the head of the Israeli Government, visited Kafr Ra'i tomorrow, how would you receive him?

[Al-Daqqah] With gunfire.

[Subayh] He is no different from any other Israeli leader. His first action on assuming power was to impose a siege on our brethren at al-Najah University, which indicated that he intended to continue with the iron-fist policy.

[YERUSHALAYIM] No. They are now talking peace.

[Abu-Sanad] They talk peace before the television cameras, but what is happening here in the territories can only be described as war. The Defense Forces under Rabin's command continue their war against the Palestinians and against the Intifadah. It is Rabin, and not Shamir, who is giving these orders!

[YERUSHALAYIM] Is there an Israeli leader with whom you would be willing to sit and talk?

[All three Black Panthers] No!

[YERUSHALAYIM] Why do you give an interview to an Israeli paper in violation of national leadership instructions?

[Respondent not specified] The leadership asked us not to appear in the media because it feared for our lives, but we would like to make the point that the security of fugitives can be maintained if the leadership focused on a solution to our problems. Journalists pose no threat to our security. Rather than ignore our case because of the peace talks, we ask members of the delegation to bring up the fugitives issue and put it high on their agenda.

Expert Warns of Linking Power Grid to Israel

93AE0152B Jerusalem AL-TALI'AH in Arabic
12 Nov 92 p 10

[Interview with Palestinian energy expert Dr. Mu'tasim al-Baba by 'Atif Sa'd; place and date not given: "Palestinian Energy Expert Warns Against Serious Dimensions of Israeli Intentions to Link 200 Villages in Regional Electricity Network"]

[Excerpts] Palestinian circles concerned with energy affairs were surprised by the Israeli media report on 4 November 1992 concerning preparations by Israel to link 200 West Bank villages in a regional electricity grid. These circles described the new Israeli step as being "the same type of obstacle in a policy aimed at deepening the occupied territories' dependence on Israel." [passage omitted]

AL-TALI'AH met with an expert in energy affairs, Dr. Mu'tasim al-Baba, head of the Department of Energy in al-Najah University and lecturer in the College of Engineering. We asked him to explain the significance of the recent Israeli step and its political, economic, and technical dimensions for the electrical and energy situation in the occupied territories.

The following is the text of this interview:

[Sa'd] How do the occupation authorities' preparations to link these villages affect the situation in the occupied territories?

[Baba] It is a significant step strategically. As for the short term, it is obviously a formality, as if it would solve a problem. However, in fact, this has not solved the problem fundamentally. It means that 90 percent or more of the occupied territories' electricity would be an inseparable part of Israeli electricity. This situation complicates matters for the Palestinian negotiator; it increases the obstacles in his path.

[Sa'd] How?

[Baba] We currently have between 400 and 450 Palestinian villages in the West Bank that are not connected with the regional electricity company, i.e., nearly one-half the villages. Of these villages, 150 are dilapidated and small. That leaves 300 villages that are medium or large-size without electricity, including 100 villages that depend on small private and cooperative generators. Therefore, Israel is leading the outside world, and even the residents, to believe that it has solved the problem.

Of course, this destroys the Palestinians' demand that a national electricity grid be established. When the Palestinians say to Japan or Europe that we need electrical energy sources, they can reply to us that the problem has been solved. Consequently, they would not be prepared to finance any project of this kind. Moreover, we would face this problem until, and even if, a solution is reached.

[Sa'd] In what sense?

[Baba] The grid and lines are the property of the regional company, not the property of the Palestinian side. If a solution is reached, it would require buying the network from the regional company. We would be faced with another problem about who would finance this purchase. We are talking here about hundreds of millions of dollars. The Palestinian government, if it existed, would not be able to rely on the grid if an independent energy board was established. The lines and extensions were built in a way to prevent the Palestinian side from using them after independence. In the occupied territories, we have parts of the network; its center—its heart—is inside Israel. This means we cannot consolidate it.

Therefore, Israel will have created a major problem, the impact of which is twofold. Politically, Israel would continue to dominate the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and, economically, it would derive the profits and gains for its own economy.

[Sa'd] What must the Palestinian side do? What is the solution?

[Baba] In my opinion, the solution must, in principle, be concentrated on one matter: establishing Palestinian infrastructure in the occupied territories, using any international aid to serve this purpose, which, basically, is to support energy, electricity, and solar energy.

If a solution is reached that guarantees Palestinian "economic independence" in the first stage, we must radically reconsider ways of doing business. Relations with the Israelis must be based on agreements signed between the two different entities and in accordance with international prices.

The occupied territories' consumption of fuels is estimated at \$80 million to \$100 million annually, all of which goes to the Israeli treasury. One should note that the selling prices are set by the government and are more than 200 percent over the prices in international markets. The Palestinian citizen in the occupied territories does not benefit from these profits.

[Sa'd] There is talk about a contracting firm cooperating with Palestinian businessmen to implement projects in connection with building the new grid for the villages. What is the significance of this?

[Baba] What is meant here is local companies, or contractors to undertake the extensions in accordance with subcontracts with the primary company, which here is the Israeli regional company. This would give a kind of bogus feeling of gaining profit from this.

This announcement attempts to make "the locals" think that they will gain a lot of profit. This is correct for the short term. Who among us can oppose bringing vital services to citizens in Palestinian villages? However, over the long term, the Israeli goal is not economic. Moreover, in my opinion, it is no longer a political goal, even though it is covered by the humanitarian label of "offering services."

Economists Assess 'Losses' to Israeli Taxes

93AE0171A Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH* in Arabic
29 Nov 92 p 9

[Editorial: "'Administration' To Finance the Government?"]

[Text] Palestinian economists have refuted Israeli claims on allocations to the occupied territories and exposed the thievery through taxation practices of the authorities there. At a seminar sponsored 12 November in occupied Jerusalem by the Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Alternative Information, statistics submitted by economists indicated the extent of Israeli larceny in the guise of taxation implemented by military means, which thereby aggravates poverty and unemployment and causes the flight abroad of domestic capital and numerous commercial and industrial enterprises.

Dr. Hisham Jabr, an expert on industrial finance, said that taxes were an impediment to Palestinian economic development and growth. He estimated resultant annual losses at about \$70 million. He put annual tax revenues at about \$50 million collected from the West Bank and another \$30 million collected from the Gaza Strip.

Automobile fees collected by Israel from the West Bank amounted to \$50 million in 1991 and in 1992, rising from some \$38 million in 1988.

Occupation authorities collect \$132 million in annual fees for travel permits across the bridges, in addition to \$500 million in customs on gifts carried by some 359,000 passengers who travel across the bridges each year.

Customs duties on imports and exports are estimated at \$400 million. The occupation authorities steal \$70 million in worker income taxes imposed at the rate of 30 percent. Aggregate income taxes collected over the past 17 years are estimated at \$1 billion.

He said that revenues from customs duties alone are twice as much as allocations to the West Bank and that taxes on local enterprises support the Israeli Government's budget and not the civilian administration's treasury.

Samir Halilah, managing director of the Economic Development Group, explained that during the 1991 Gulf war, occupation authorities transferred 160 million shekels from the civilian administration treasury to the Israeli Treasury.

He said that Palestinians invested \$91 million in the small industry sector in 1990, compared with expenditures of \$380 million for housing and construction. Taxes mainly target heavy industry, which explains why Palestinian investors tend to shy away from heavy industry in favor of light industries.

He added that development funding agencies provided \$11 million in six years to support 1,600 small enterprises in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

He said that Israeli tax laws endanger local investments and make loans difficult to obtain.

Attorney Muna Rashmawi, managing director of the Center for Sovereign Judiciary and Law, said that taxation is an act of sovereignty and an important indicator of a nation's state

of growth and development but that the occupation authorities are working in reverse and ignoring the laws that existed prior to the occupation.

She explained that a major portion of tax revenues is spent outside the occupied territories. There is the secret business fund from which Israel itself benefits. There is also the Judea and Samaria Fund, which is run by settlers. The two funds are beneficiaries of the amounts collected by occupation authorities from travelers crossing the bridges and of the properties and funds confiscated from them.

She said that there is an urgent need to apply lawful and humanitarian standards to taxation in the occupied territories.

It is noteworthy that even Israeli Minister of Police Moshe Shahal pretended to be shocked and stunned when he visited the Jordan River bridges a few months back and learned of the heavy taxes imposed on arriving Palestinian visitors who bring with them personal gifts for their relatives.

Ramallah Chamber Head Opposes Industrial Council

93AE0171C Amman *AL-RIBAT* in Arabic 11 Nov 92 p 8

[Interview with Ramallah Chamber of Commerce President Hajj As'ad Hassunah; in Amman; date not given]

[Text]

[AL-RIBAT] What is the general function of the Chamber of Commerce as defined by laws and regulations?

[Hassunah] The most important functions of the chamber are:

- Providing various import export data on all goods from all countries of the world and establishing means of contacting importers and exporters.
- Classifying merchants by type of commercial activity for statistical purposes.
- Arbitrating merchant disputes.
- Helping to prepare feasibility studies for all projected enterprises.
- It is the chamber's burden under current conditions to intercede in various problems created by the occupation, such as problems of taxation, curfews, extended closure of streets and shops, and the resulting negative impact on commercial activity.

[AL-RIBAT] What role do chambers of commerce in the West Bank (merchant division) play in the Palestinian intifadah?

[Hassunah] The chamber's role under the occupation is to do all it can to help the brethren merchants cope day in and day out with measures imposed by the occupation authorities, which cause countless difficulties because of their complexity.

[AL-RIBAT] What are some of those difficulties?

[Hassunah] A. Difficulties caused by the occupation authorities:

The commercial sector experiences many difficulties under the occupation. Among the most significant:

- Extremely exorbitant taxes that have reached astronomical levels and the lack of documentation of the regulations and legal amendments issued by the authorities.
- Tax collection methods. The Army is used to collecting taxes with military force that instills fear and worry and consequently leads to horrible exploitation.
- Closing roads, stopping traffic, shutting down whole sections, and preventing merchants from going to their shops.
- Nondelivery of the official gazette, causing ignorance of changes in the law.

B. Difficulties caused by those who lost chamber elections include:

- Attempts to establish such parallel organizations as the Industrial Commercial Club, which received preliminary approval from occupation authorities.
- Attempts to create the Supreme Industrial Council, which would duplicate performance and fractionalize efforts.
- Attempts to distort and belittle chamber accomplishments.
- Attempts to induce certain chamber members to stop cooperating with the rest of the members.
- Holding parallel economic seminars in order to attract the public and attempt to undermine chamber performance.

[AL-RIBAT] What must your brethren in Jordan do as a government and as a people to support your activity?

[Hassunah] We ask our Jordanian brethren, as government and as people, to do the following:

A. Officially:

- Help promote the transit of goods (surplus of production) through Jordan to internal, as well as external, markets.
- Promote and facilitate cooperation between institutions and chambers of commerce in Jordan and the in the West Bank in order to raise the performance standards of chambers of commerce in the West Bank.
- Hold training sessions for employees of West Bank chambers in order to inform them of the skills and technologies of Jordanian chambers of commerce.

B. The Jordanian people are asked to:

- Encourage the transfer of commercial and industrial proposals that could be implemented in the West Bank to compete with Israeli goods in ability, quality, and efficiency.
- Provide financial support, which would include facilitating loans from financial institutions in order to proliferate small machine shops, and to spread commercial awareness in all cities and villages of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

[AL-RIBAT] What are some of your recent contributions to the chamber of commerce?

[Hassunah] I must first point out that the chamber is still in its infancy. However, its more significant accomplishments include:

- Chamber offices were decorated and refurbished. A separate office was set-up for the chamber's president. A computer and a photocopier have already been acquired.
- Construction of chamber headquarters is now nearing completion. Three main floors were added to the original two, and the five floors are now being completed simultaneously, as planned.
- The chamber has contacted officials of the military government and liberated a 750-dunam plot that had been confiscated by the Israeli Army in 'Ayn Kinya. Farmers there are now fully utilizing their lands.
- Agreement was reached with the authorities to stop commandeering private cars on public streets on the pretext of using them in search operations.
- The chamber is working to put an end to provocations by revenueurs, such as by raiding shops. An investigation was made into the matter.
- All foreign institutions, consulates, and embassies have been requested to help the chamber implement the plans that we are currently formulating.
- The chamber held the Exhibition of Commerce and Industry, which was the most successful such exhibition ever and was visited by more than 15,000 citizens daily.

[AL-RIBAT] What are your future objectives?

[Hassunah] Our objectives are big and wide, but the chamber realistically hopes to accomplish the following:

- Establish a specialized modern information bank.
- Create a new division to evaluate existing enterprises and conduct feasibility studies on existing and proposed projects.
- Finish constructing the chamber building and furnish it with modern equipment in order to serve commercial interests and keep pace with technological advances in the world.
- Create a credit facility corporation. We applied for an Islamic bank license, but have not yet received a response. Others have already been granted a commercial bank license even though their applications were submitted at a much later than ours.

The purpose of that [credit facility] corporation would be to facilitate lending in accordance with Islamic Shari'a through partnerships, profit-sharing, or sometimes even by interest-free lending in order to create activities and small shops that would ease unemployment.

- Create product quality and efficiency standards that factories can utilize to achieve high levels of efficiency and product quality and [therefore be able] to compete with Israeli products.
- Create a legal department that would offer all merchants legal advice on current and future problems and, in the absence of law and a state, arbitrate disputes among merchants.

- Continue to hold annual commercial exhibits and bazaars in order to energize the country's commercial activity.

[AL-RIBAT] How do you assess the responsiveness of the people and their leaders to current peace efforts?

[Hassunah] This is difficult to say, but there is a consensus that mandatory solutions will be imposed on the people whether they like them or not.

Responsiveness, however, is an individual initiative. The position taken by the Islamic movement, which represents a major segment of the population, is clear and well-publicized.

[AL-RIBAT] The Islamic movement's victory in Ramallah, a city with a large Christian population, mandates a certain course of action. How did you deal with that situation?

[Hassunah] The chamber has an economic function, and therefore it exists to serve all, be they Muslim, Christian, or of some other ideology. The chamber has done just that since the very first moment of the elections and has proven to be sincere and even-handed in all dealings. It functions with absolute objectivity and does not treat one citizen any differently than another.

Businesses Start Campaign for More Foreign Trade

93AE0142C London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
18 Nov 92 p 4

[Article from Amman: "Palestinians Seek Foreign Trade Despite Deadlock in Peace Talks"]

[Text] While the peace negotiations in Washington are stalemated, Palestinians in the occupied Arab territories are conducting talks in Jordan on opportunities for boosting their commercial activity with the outside world.

The talks are being conducted by the presidents of the chambers of commerce of eight cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The officials are discussing ways of opening their markets to the outside world.

Gaza City Chamber of Commerce President Muhammad al-Qudwah said yesterday that "we hope the Arab countries will respond to our basic request and provide facilities to the products of the occupied territories and open their markets for them. That would help build our economic structure for the coming political phase, so that we will be able to disengage ourselves from the Israeli economy."

Other Palestinian trade officials in a UN-sponsored delegation said that farmers in the occupied territories are forced to destroy some of their harvests because of the lack of distribution outlets. The delegation will visit Egypt, Cyprus, Austria, and France in an effort to promote Palestinian products.

To some Palestinian officials, the talks Palestinian officials conducted with the presidents of the Arab chambers of commerce who attended the annual meeting in Amman last week were the first contact they had with non-Jordanian Arab businessmen since Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967.

In addition, some of them were elected for the first time last year, when Israel permitted elections for those posts. Some of their complaints were against protectionist trade measures imposed by some Arab countries and the intensified restrictions put into place by the Israeli occupation authorities. Since Jordanian ruler King Husayn announced the end of administrative ties to the West Bank in 1988, fruit and vegetable exports, which represent 32 percent of the occupied territories' income, declined sharply. Exports also dropped to other Arab countries, which had begun to cultivate the same crops on their land.

Agricultural engineer 'Umar Daudi said that it is up to the Palestinians to change their crops in order to penetrate European markets.

He said that farmers would have to abandon the cultivation of eggplants and green peppers, and turn to growing artichokes, asparagus, and avocados for European markets, which have bought almost nothing despite a trade agreement signed in 1986.

Daudi, who works as a UNDP [UN Development Program] liaison officer in Jerusalem, said that disengaging the West Bank and Gaza from Israeli restrictions would reduce production costs, inflated by the rise in water prices, taxes, and the lack of raw material importers.

It is practically impossible, given Israeli security measures, for Palestinians to import raw materials from anywhere but Israel, while the Arab boycott bans any products connected to the Jewish state.

The Israelis strip all trucks entering over the Jordan River of everything but their chassis in the process of inspecting them, looking for explosives.

This industry, which makes up 8 percent of the occupied territories' income, has been hurt by the occupation and the Palestinian intifadah. Palestinians said that despite a great deal of talk, investors abroad were still holding on to their money until the chances for the coming of peace to the region were clearer.

Ramallah Chamber of Commerce President Wajih (al-'Atari) said, "So far there is no one who will agree to risk large capital. Many feasibility studies have been done, but most of the interest is local, and comes from individual initiatives by investors in the occupied territories."

Daudi said that if Israel gives up its control of the West Bank and Gaza, the biggest economic growth rate would be in the construction sector.

Hebron Mayor Tours New Power Plant, Reservoir

93AE0142B Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 4 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by "Special Correspondent in Hebron"]

[Text] Hebron Mayor Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid al-Zir, accompanied by a number of municipal engineers, yesterday toured a number of projects that the municipality is implementing. The doctor started with a visit to the new 10-megawatt electric station the municipality is installing in the al-Dahdah area. When construction is completed it will have 20 megawatts. The station will supply light to the Society of Friends of the Sick's al-Ahli Hospital in Hebron. He also visited the two new dynamometer stations, as well as the first station the municipality installed to speed up work on and inspection of citizens' cars. The cost of the station is estimated at 200,000 shekels. After that, he visited the new

reservoir the municipality built in the al-Manshar area to supply the area with water from the south of Hebron to the west of it. The municipality will extend a water pipeline from al-Manshar Reservoir as far as the Khallat-Batrakh line in the city, about 4 km. The mayor then visited the al-Qawa'ah area, where the municipality is paving a new, 2-km-long street with the participation of the municipality and the people of that area.

West Bankers Complain of High Taxes This Year

93AE0152C Jerusalem AL-TALI'AH in Arabic
12 Nov 92 p 10

[Article: "Reprisal Attitude, Oppressive Estimates by Income Tax Officials; Economic Experts Say 38 to 45 Million Shekels Collected in Nine Months"]

[Excerpts] During the past two weeks, economic experts have noted a reprisal attitude by the taxation authorities whose officers and employees carry out collecting operations in the West Bank. They concern their campaigns against popular groups and sectors that the authorities think were avoiding payment of taxes during the five years of the intifadah.

It is estimated that during the first nine months of 1992, some 38 to 45 million Israeli shekels have been collected in the West Bank in the form of income taxes and additional fines. This is enough to pay wages to 100,000 workers for more than three months, if the current minimum wages is compounded at 1,000 shekels per worker.

Qassis Calls For Bookkeeping

Accountant Fu'ad Qassis stressed that the piaster that the employer pays to the worker relieves him of the value of income tax charges and contributes to accelerating the economic cycle and raising its productivity. It enables the workers to increase spending, keeps money in the people's hands, and prevents the largest possible part of the money from going to the tax authorities. Qassis encouraged those responsible for bookkeeping to be accurate, in order to avoid exorbitant tax estimates by the Israeli authorities. [passage omitted]

Authorities Must Follow Logical Path

Muhammad Masruji, chairman of the Manufacturers Committee and chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jerusalem Medical Preparations Company in al-Birah-Ramallah, thinks that the matter of taxes is an integrated matter. It does not apply to only one facet of areas of expenditure, such as increased workers' wages. The worker is obligated to pay income taxes, either to pay them himself or to have the company pay them for him. Taxes are a burden, generally, on the one who is obligated, whether it is the employer or the worker. Taxation is considerably higher than its counterpart in Israel, since an Israeli whose monthly income is less than 2,590 shekels is exempt from income tax. A Palestinian citizen whose income is more than 605 shekels must pay income tax.

Manufacturing, commercial, and trade establishments suffer from excessive taxation and limited markets. They operate in difficult and unnatural circumstances. This is the framework for determining the value of wages by virtue of the simple, modest resources available to these establishments.

Masruji stressed that the authorities must follow a logical path in assessing tax percentages and adhere to evenhandedness in their levies. This would be a step forward in improving economic conditions and, consequently, spending power.

The Solution is Collective

Al-Haj As'ad Hassunah, chief of Ramallah's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and a member of the Office of the Palestinian Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, referred to the importance of accurate bookkeeping and the need to show expenditures in the manner specified by official documents in order to prevent excessiveness in estimating income earned during a given time period. He believes that the way tax officials determine the merchant's profit ratio is, at times, considerably higher than what has in fact been earned.

Hassunah has found that the problem of taxation is a common problem that cannot be solved unilaterally. It requires the efforts of more than one chamber of commerce and industry, in view of the connection of the taxation system with the political decision-making of the occupation authorities, who have consistently issued military orders concerning taxes and other matters since the first days of the occupation in 1967.

Businessman Calls Industrial Council Non-Starter

93AE0149A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 16 Nov 92 p 10

[Report from Amman: "President of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce Opposes the Supreme Industrial Council"]

[Text] 'Ali Qaddurah, president of the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in the occupied territories, said that the Palestinian Supreme Industrial Council, which was created last October, "has failed and died in its infancy" for lack of support by Palestinian industrialists. He told AL-HAYAH that the "board of the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip met last week to discuss the Supreme Council then issued a statement denouncing its creation and calling upon the Palestinians to refrain from cooperating with it."

Qaddurah explained that the Federation of Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture is not discrediting the council leaders. His position, and that of the federation, rather, stems from the fact "that the council members are not true representatives of Palestinian industrialists," who are already represented in chambers of commerce in major Palestinian cities.

He added: "Those chambers are called Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, and they are the forum through which Palestinian industrialists express their views."

He said: "There are 10 chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture in the occupied territories. Eight of those chambers held democratic elections sometime last year, and Palestinian industrialists are represented on their boards of directors...."

"Three of those chambers, in Nabulus, al-Khalil, and Tulkarm, are chaired by industrialists and not by merchants. The chairman of the board of the Qalqiliyah chamber comes from the agricultural sector."

Qaddurah explained that in the Nabulus chamber, eight of the 12 directors are industrialists, including the chairman.

Qaddurah, who attended meetings of the board of directors of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture in Amman last week, said that "the board of the Federation of Palestinian chambers has immediately expressed opposition to the Council since it duplicates the function of the Federation and is therefore harmful to the Palestinian economic movement."

A number of Palestinian economic sectors in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had agreed to establish a strong and cohesive economic entity in the occupied territories that would be able to fill any economic vacuum that may occur as a result of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and the creation of an interim Palestinian self-government as a step towards an independent state in the West Bank and the Strip.

There is speculation that Ibrahim Salamah, a businessman from occupied Jerusalem, is a nominee for the council's chair. Ziyad Abu-Ayn, of the West Bank, and Ma'mun al-Ghazindar, of the Gaza Strip, have been mentioned as vice chairmen. The three men are known to be close to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whose supporters control the boards of the chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza. Supporters of the Hamas Islamic movement are also influential on those boards, however.

On another subject, Qaddurah welcomed the creation of a Palestinian bank in the West Bank and Gaza, which, he believes, will generally facilitate economic and commercial transactions in the occupied Palestinian territories.

He said: "The banks that operate in Palestine are Israeli and do not meet national needs. The Cairo-Amman Bank has no branches in any of the major Palestinian cities and is not allowed to operate in the Gaza Strip." He added that the economic sector is in dire need of a Palestinian national bank.

Fatah Officers Protest Military Cuts

93AE0144B Amman AL-RIBAT in Arabic 27 Oct 92 p 15

[Article: "Communique of Command Committee of Free Officers in Fatah: Decision To Dissolve Military Organizations Part of Settlement Deal"]

[Text] The Command Committee of Free Officers in the Fatah Movement has issued a statement titled "Communique No. 1." It addresses the military commanders' stand on the settlement process and the decision of the Palestinian leadership to dissolve military organizations. We are printing some of what the statement contained, and we will be pleased to hear the response of Fatah's official quarters. The most important portions of the statement follow:

Masses of Our Noble People!

For three decades, we have unsheathed our weapons to restore our stolen property, Palestine, and for its sake, we have plunged into battle after battle. We have fought nobly. We have lost the finest martyrs. We have made departure after departure; our blood and tears have flowed. Ashes have burned, limbs have been lost; heads and skulls have flown. The harshest types of pressure and suppression have been used against us, to make us surrender. Siege after siege was imposed; one purge followed another.

In spite of all that befell us, in spite of the sorrows and the pain and hardship we endured, we never gave in for a moment. We were never gripped by feelings of uselessness, and we never imagined we would live without a revolution. Revolution is the beautiful significance we have in this life, for as long as we live and our property is stolen, our holy places violated, and our land usurped. We have borne this significance in our emotions and our consciences, just as our hands have borne weapons.

The cruelest blows are those treacherous ones struck from behind, struck by the cowards who sold their consciences and feelings, after having sold their land and honor. Today we stand face-to-face with the clique that abandoned its cultural and historic role beside our Palestinian people. This armed, rotten, opportunist clique, which is playing wicked games against Palestine—cause, revolution, and people—now completes the scenario by wanting to strip us of our weapons, after deciding to dissolve the military organizations, to show good will to its Zionist and American masters.

Masses of Our Proud People!

Based on our faith in the sanctity of our struggle against the Zionist usurpers of Palestine, on our legitimate armed struggle to restore our stolen nation, and our historic responsibility, and to reveal traitorous facts and practices, we will give you details of the incident of the Palestinian embassy in Algiers, as one in a series of conspiracies and purges against the vital forces of our revolution and our people.

After what 'Arafat did through his security service in the person of Hakam Bal'awi, a "PLO national security official" who offered to give out the names of Palestinian fighters who reject the capitulationist-settlement line with the Zionist enemy, to expel them from the Algeria of a million and a half martyrs, he offered to reveal the list to the units of Algerian Security through 'Awni Samarah, the military attache of the State of Palestine's embassy in Algiers. In an effort to protest, a procession of our honorable Palestinian

people marched to demonstrate inside the embassy building, to talk to the Ambassador of the State of Palestine in Algeria for a stop to the expulsions. That was on 27 September 1992. After the march entered the embassy building, the embassy's security officers, armed with pistols, began to act in a provocative manner against the visitors. After drafting the demands the committee was to present to the ambassador and discuss with him, the committee was permitted to meet the ambassador at exactly 1330. While the committee was in the meeting with the ambassador, one of their number in the reception room of the embassy asked a security officer if he might go to the restroom. His request was refused, but after insisting, he was allowed to enter the restroom. When he came out, our combatant brother was set upon by the security guards, who insulted and cursed him. When he responded to them, they locked the door of the embassy's security room and beat him. Those present intervened and broke down the door to the room. The security guards rained blows on them, and the visitors fought with them. They got the combatant out of the room. After that, the embassy security asked them to leave; they complied and left the embassy building. Then the security officers drew their pistols and told them, "If anyone comes near the wall of the embassy, we will open fire on him." Our brothers asked the embassy's security officers to go in and close the windows, but they refused and began to fire in the air over their heads. When the demonstrators responded with stones, the embassy's security chief, one, "Abu-Yasir Miqdad"—the one who had given the order to shoot—told the security men, "Open fire, and kill anyone who comes near the embassy windows." He went up to his office on the second floor and summoned Algerian security. Algerian security men showed up along with a force of the Algerian national police. It was a virtual occupation of the embassy building. Embassy security officer Abu-Yasir Miqdad gave our Algerian brothers a list of the names of numerous fighters whom he accused of leading an attack against the embassy of the State of Palestine. Four of those present were arrested, and Algerian security is still hunting down the rest of the names on the list—there are 12 of them—to arrest them.

What was this act but part of what 'Arafat is planning to do through his security agencies. It includes forcing honorable fighters to kneel, burying them, and forcing them to emigrate to Europe, along the lines of what happened in 1990, when he expelled fighters into Libya's al-Sarah desert, on the pretext of helping our Libyan brothers to victory against the regime in Chad. All of these things happened in stages. More than 180 of our revolution's finest fighters were expelled after the decision to move them to the desert of al-Sarah, and now the Palestinian security agencies are giving a list to Algerian security to deport the fighters from Algerian territory with the claim that the Palestinian fighters were interfering in the internal affairs of the Algerian state. All this for the sake of the seventh round of the surrender negotiations aimed against our Palestinian people.

Masses of Our People!

So we turn to the masses of our Palestinian people, in the name of our great martyrs, and the sanctity of the usurped land of Palestine, for you to have your say and to reject the policy of capitulation, shame, and humiliation pursued

against our Palestinian people both inside and outside the occupied territories, and for you to rally around your brothers, the free officers in Fatah, for you to join hands with them:

1. So that weapons will still be carried to liberate the usurped soil of our country.
2. To reject all methods leading the PLO leadership to the autonomy conspiracy.
3. Declaring a single policy against the conspiracy the PLO leadership is trying to impose on our combatant people, for us to settle outside the occupied lands, in the Arab countries.
4. To reject the policy of giving up even an inch of the soil of our sacred country.

We respect the unified leadership of the intifadah and ask it and all vital national and Islamic forces to stand with their brothers, the free officers of Fatah, and to declare a unified stand rejecting the policy of capitulation, [affirming] continued armed revolution, and for the free, precious, honorable Palestinian gun to remain pointed in the face of the Zionist usurper until Palestine is liberated—all Palestine, from sea to sea, and from the south to the south [as published]. We respect the honorable and free people of the Arab and Islamic nation and call on them to stand beside their brothers, the revolutionaries of Palestine and protectors of Jerusalem, and not to leave them alone in the field of honor and glory. God is great, and He is the shamer of conspirators.

Report Summarizes National Health Plan

93AE0148A Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 4, 5 Nov 92

[Articles: "Preliminary Report on the Palestinian National Health Plan"]

[4 Nov p 7]

[Excerpts] This plan was announced a few days ago at the Professional Unions' headquarters in Bayt Hanina, Jerusalem. Representatives of various organizations and health providers in the occupied territories attended and participated. The following is a preliminary report on the plan. [passage omitted]

Assessment of Health and Medical Services Available to Palestinians

Health services in the area are extremely poor when measured against world standards. This is manifested in short median life spans of 62 years for women and 60 years for men. The [occupied] territories also suffer a high infant mortality rate of 40 to 50 per 1,000 births. More significantly, patient rosters indicate a sharp rise in the incidence of illness.

Aggregate health expenditures for Palestinians dropped in the 1980's, from \$30 to \$22 per capita compared with an increase from \$350 to \$500 per Israeli.

The services offered are not comprehensive, but are selective in relation to certain needs, which translates into unequal distribution of health and medical services.

Health services and activities available both locally and nationwide fall short of the slogan of "Health for All by the Year 2000."

Health services are too costly for the common individual.

Despite the funds expended for refurbishing and modernizing old hospitals and for the purchase of modern instruments and equipment, etc., hospitals and health facilities remain poorly outfitted.

Palestinian Health System's Drawbacks

The Palestinian health system's drawbacks may be summarized as follows:

- The lack of coordination among major health institutions.
- The absence of integration or complementarity between available health and social services, on one hand, and primary care and hospital services, on the other.
- Those with health insurance account for no more than 20 percent of all Palestinians.
- Physicians do not provide appropriate primary care, resulting in a needless rise in the number of cases referred to hospitals.
- The health system's focus on treatment comes at the expense of prevention, which in itself negates success and effectiveness.
- Long waiting periods exist for the treatment of certain cases, especially those that require relatively high specialization.
- Health workers lack the self-motivation to improve performance in effective and productive ways.

- Broad segments of the population lack knowledge and awareness of appropriate personal health care and of how to tap available health services.

Obstacles to Health Services Development

The development of health services in the occupied territories is influenced by factors that frustrate the development of health services, such as the lack of Palestinian control over:

- Water sources: water supplies, including consumption and management.
- Land: housing and other environmental issues.
- Taxation.
- Laws and regulations. [passage omitted]

Some National Health Plan Objectives

- Give health care providers a solid foundation for improvement.
- Improve health conditions.
- Bridge the disparity and inequality in health services utilization by different Palestinians.
- Increase and raise the standard of preventive health care services available to all Palestinians.
- Enact laws that would regulate health care workers and commit them to specific performance standards.
- Coordinate among existing health systems.
- Establish a comprehensive health insurance system.

Means of Achieving Those Objectives

- Combine and standardize national and local (internal) health care objectives.
- Focus on improving health conditions in the region where health care is available.
- Properly utilize data on health conditions in order to define goals and objectives in a way that would allow help achieve and evaluate targeted progress.
- Deal with health services as an integrated system and evaluate the impact of proposed changes proposed to one segment of the system on other segments of the same system.
- Study the impact on health conditions of environmental and individual behavior.
- Identify specific objectives and prioritize requirements as guidelines for decision-making and for adopting pragmatic measures on health care.
- Influence national policy through the national health plan.
- Consider the influence and activities of planning organizations and of all those who can specifically impact the course of health services for the Palestinian people. [passage omitted]

The Process of Developing the National Health Plan

The national health plan was developed through a joint, nationwide cooperative effort. The planning committee, composed of 13 members and a program director, assumed basic responsibility in that regard.

The task of preparing the necessary materials and consultation was entrusted to the National Health Plan Department. Once a draft of the plan was completed, it was offered for

review by health specialists, health providers, and workshop participants, whose comments and remarks enriched the plan. All their thoughts, observations, and viewpoints were collected, analyzed, and studied by the committee which then amended the draft and presented it to the Palestinian Red Crescent for adoption and ratification.

The process of developing the plan was clear and open from the start and involved a representative sample of Palestinian society. The plan does not reflect the viewpoints or established procedures of any specific organization, nor does it represent any individual conception. Rather, it is the product of a comprehensive national process. The effort that went into it sought to make it responsive to the pressing problems of Palestinian society by focusing on matters of extreme urgency. The committee charged with preparing the plan relied not only on open and on-going discussion, but also on study groups and scholarly seminars in participation with numerous organizations, thereby reaping the benefit of the resulting comments, guidance, and observations. The entire document, therefore, reflects the outcome of all of the meetings and discussions that took place during the planning stage.

Provisions and Components of the National Health Plan

The following index gives an overview of National Health Plan components:

- Document No. 1: The state of health in the occupied territories.
- Document No. 2: Palestinian Demography (Occupied Palestinian Territories).
- Document No. 3: Palestinian awareness of health problems, obstacles, needs, and of the means of utilizing available services.
- Document No. 4: Towards a Palestinian health plan—Looking to the future.
- Document No. 5: Palestinian national health planning: Tools, strategies, and means of achievement.
- Document No. 6: Mapping the state of health—tables and appendices.
- Document No. 7: Defining human and financial resources.

Contents of the Seven Documents

Document No. 1: The state of health in the occupied territories.

This descriptive document reviews health conditions, population demographic characteristics, and the state of health restraints and socioeconomic factors, such as education, profession, income, housing, state of societal health (i.e., the health of mothers and children), disease incidence ratio, the mortality table, and the utilization of available health services.

Document No. 2: Palestinian demography.

This document quantifies the population for the years 1987, 1992, 1997, 2000, and 2002 and includes size, geographic distribution, ratio of males to females, age categories, and rates of population growth. Such factors were determined on the basis of various estimates forecast since 1982 that reflect

various assumptions on future variations in the categories of births, deaths, and immigration.

Document No. 3: Palestinian awareness of health problems, obstacles, and needs, as well as means of utilizing available health services.

This document describes the process used to define the full range of society's needs and priorities by querying a mix of individuals representative of various segments and classes of the population.

The findings of this study corroborated the conclusions of national health plan workshops after making the evaluations needed to define health needs. If anything, this corroboration testifies to the soundness and accuracy of the conclusions of the two studies despite the disparity of techniques and methodologies employed.

Document No. 4: Towards a Palestinian health plan—looking to the future.

This document deals with the Palestinian health strategy and includes all the recommendations made by health care specialists who took part in meetings and seminars held for that purpose. Involved in the recommendations are the following issues:

- The health infrastructure.
- Existing regional challenges especially in preventive health care, health maintenance, and health safeguards (protection against illness).
- Integrating Palestinian health sectors.

Document No. 5: Palestinian national health planning: tools, strategies, and means of achievement.

This deals with the process, components, and purpose of planning. It focuses on practical issues of implementation and deals with the interrelationships between the demand for health services and the availability of health workers.

Document No. 6: Mapping the state of health—tables and appendices.

This document tabulates all factors that influence a population's state of health, such as demographics, epidemics, and economic status.

Document No. 7: Defining human and financial resources.

This is a study of various health services. It lists available resources and surveys resources that will be needed in the future. The components of this document reflect the policies, positions, goals, and recommendations on proposed changes that must be applied to all components of the health care system if it is to be developed and made more effective.

It is obvious that the focus has been on diagnostic and curative health services as well on their cost and ease of utilization. Hospitals were the primary provider considered in conformity with the planning paths charted by the National Health Plan committee.

[5 Nov p 7]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

An objective of the National Health Plan is to induce Palestinians to realize the eight objectives that are defined in the first article [4 November] and that are considered the

most that can be accomplished. We have ample opportunity to achieve our goals. The plan reflects several of the fields and opportunities that were presented in the form of quantifiable goals and objectives that are supposed to be achieved by 2002. The plan, as well as the various workshops, worked with a long list that may be classified into three categories:

- Preventive health
- Health maintenance
- Health safeguards

Their components were classified as follows:

Preventive health and services:

- Administrative and support services.
- Maternal and child care.
- Clots and heart diseases.
- Cancer.
- Chronic disease management.
- Sexually transmitted diseases.
- Management of outbreaks.
- Primary care.
- Epidemiology and epidemic control.
- Hereditary disease management.
- Adolescence.
- The aging and the infirm.

Health promotion and maintenance:

- Nutritional services.
- Tobacco use and addiction.
- Alcohol and drug addiction.
- Physical education and fitness.
- Mental health.
- Family planning.
- Violence and aggressive behavior.
- Social health education.
- Continuing education.

Health safeguards:

- Environmental health: air quality, noise control, institutional sanitary standards, solid waste treatment, poisonous and dangerous materials, insect and disease-carrying animal control, sewage treatment, potable water, and environmental health services.
- Injury control.
- Job safety and health.
- Training services.
- Emergency services.
- Laboratory services.
- Food safeguards.
- Oral and dental hygiene.
- Health insurance.

Preventive health services include administrative and support services, health counseling, immunization against disease, and even chemical protection for all hospitals and health center patients.

The following fields were also endowed with the priority they deserve: maternal and child care, clots and vascular

and heart diseases, cancer, diabetes, chronic diseases, venereal diseases, contagious diseases, adolescence, and geriatrics.

The plan also touched on professional considerations and means of obtaining clinical preventive health services.

It placed special emphasis on information gathering systems and on monitoring operational techniques to ascertain the accuracy and soundness of information gathering procedures at every level. Objectives have been defined to improve and develop such procedures.

Strategies aimed at improving and developing personal lifestyles involve individual choices, made in a social context, that would effectively impact all aspects of a person's health. These include physical activity and fitness, nutrition, smoking, alcohol and drug intake, family planning, mental health and psychoses, and violence and aggressive behavior. It is the responsibility of educational and social programs to address individual lifestyles and to explain them clearly. There is increasing need, therefore, for emphasis on the implementation of programs to regularly evaluate health workers. These programs are gaining popularity, and enrollment is rising. Objectives have already been defined that would help develop and improve efforts in that field.

Health maintenance strategies depend on regular environmental standards capable of instituting safeguards and ensuring health maintenance for large segments of the population. These strategies are a function of such factors as accidental injury, health training, emergency medical services, testing laboratories, occupational and hygienic safety, environmental health, and procedures for food and medicine consumption and for oral hygiene. Procedures for dealing with the issues above cannot be described as purely preventive. A basic element of health promotion may also be involved because the focus here is more on society than on the individual.

Finally, the plan devoted a special chapter to health insurance issues and procedures. Among the major subjects discussed are health maintenance, health safeguards, and preventive services as control factors. The ranking of priorities and objectives formed an overall topic [words missing] with joint responsibility for implementation of the plan.

The process of defining health conditions calls for knowledge of the influencing factors, ranging from heredity to individual behavior to family and societal environments. Available opportunities and the responsibility for improving and raising health standards therefore fall to the individual and to health agencies. There is urgent need to utilize rules and regulations and societal endorsement if social and class environments are to be rendered suitable. This would require mobilizing specialists and professionals not only to treat illnesses but also to prevent their occurrence and to create a climate that would reduce infant mortality and permanent disability.

The National Health Plan committee would like to emphasize that the implementation of the plan would depend on other important factors such as surveys of needed human and financial resources (Documents 6 and 7), which are still under way and the findings of which will be released in the first quarter of 1993. This is due to the fact that it is difficult

to apply the conclusions of health plan workshops to all sectors of health services. Work groups have been formed and given the task of dealing with each issue separately. Meanwhile, the focus on specific issues should not be misconstrued as the total thrust of the major issues entertained by the plan which addressed not only the dangerous and acute bed shortage but also long-term care, temporary care, care provided by family and society, and primary care. All of the aforementioned health care sectors are extremely important for improving health care in order to reduce its financial burden and raise the standard of health services.

Developing the plan through successive follow-ups would expand its scope and make it even more comprehensive

with special emphasis on specific issues. Annual revisions and evaluations would render plan objectives easier to define, quantify, and appraise. This is anticipated as tangible results are achieved during early stages of implementation and as basic information needed for improving and developing the quality of services offered becomes available.

We, as we present this plan in its preliminary form, look forward to the discussions, comments, and remarks it will generate. All those who took part in shaping it over the past 14 months can be proud of their clear perceptions of the state of health as reflected in this plan.

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